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I. INTRODUCTION 
• Among other achievements, the modern law-as-literature move-
ment has prompted increasing numbers of legal scholars to embrace 
the claim that adjudication is interpretation, and more specifically, 
that constitutional adjudication is interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. 1 That adjudication is interpretation-that an adjudicative act 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland Law School; B.A., 
.University of Maryland Baltimore County; J.D., University of Maryland Law School; 
J.S.M., Stanford Law School. I would like to thank Tom Grey, Peter Quint, Richard 
Posner, Daniel Conkle, James Boyd White, Michael Kelly and the participants in 
the Northwestern Law School Legal Theory Workshop and the University of Illinois 
Faculty Colloquium Series, for comments on early drafts of this article. 
1. The law-as-literature movement is becoming increasingly difficult to de-
fine, as it comes of age. It has, I think, at least three strands. First, there is a 
growing body of scholarship from legal scholars regarding the legal and jurispruden-
tial ideas contained in literature. See, e.g., Kuffler, Capital in Hell: Dante's Lesson 
203 
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is an interpretive act-more than any other central commitment, 
unifies the otherwise diverse strands of the legal and constitutional 
theory of the late twentieth century. Owen Fiss, for example, begins 
his influential article Objectivity and Interpretation with the claim 
that "Adjudication is interpretation: Adjudication is the process by 
which a judge comes to understand and express the meaning of an 
authoritative legal text and the values embodied in that text.' '2 
Ronald Dworkin begins his article How Law is Like Literature with 
a remarkably similar declaration: 
I shall argue that legal practice is an exercise in interpretation not 
only when lawyers interpret particular documents or statutes but 
generally . . . . [W]e can improve our understanding of law by 
comparing legal interpretation with interpretation in ... literature. 
I also expect that law, when better understood, will provide a 
better grasp of what interpretation is in general.3 
Tom Grey summarizes the state of the art in the opening paragraphs 
of his most recent contribution to the interpretivism literature, The 
Constitution as Scripture, thusly: 
If the current interest in interpretive theory, or hermeneutics, does 
nothing else, at least it shows that the concept of interpretation is 
broad enough to encompass any plausible mode of constitutional 
adjudication. We are all interpretivists; the real arguments are not 
over whether judges should stick to interpreting, but over what they 
should interpret and what interpretive attitudes they should adopt. 4 
on Usury, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 608 (1985); Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some 
Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor With an Application to Justice 
Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1982); West, Authority, Aut"nomy and Choice: 
The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard 
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384 (1986). Second, both legal and literary scholars are 
studying the relationship between literary criticism and legal criticism, and between 
literary theory and legal theory. In addition to the articles discussed in this piece, 
see R. DWORKIN, How Law is Like Literature, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 
(1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN); Symposium on Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 
(1982); Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. (1985). See also Cover, The 
Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 
1 (1983); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreward: Traces of Seif-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986). Third, there is a growing awareness 
amongst legal scholars that both law and legal theory can profitably be read as 
literature. See, e.g., J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1982) (reading law as 
literature); West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal 
Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 145 (1985). For a general bibliography of writings of 
the law and literature movement through 1979, see Suretsky, Search for a Theory: 
An Annotated Bibliography of Writings on the Relation of Law to Literature and 
the Humanities, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 727 (1979). 
2. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982). 
3. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 146. 
4. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984) (emphasis 
added). 
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However, Grey's claim that "we are all interpretivists," while it 
states an important truth, also misleads. For while it is true, in a 
sense, that today most constitutional theorists are interpretivists, it 
is not the case that all constitutional theorists are interpretivists, 
and it is surely not the case that this has always been so. That 
adjudication consists primarily of the interpretation of texts is a 
very old claim-its roots lie in Blackstone's insistence that adjudi-
cation is primarily the discovery, not the creation of law. But in 
our century as in Blackstone's time, there is a competing, non-
interpretivist vision of what adjudication is, and although no longer 
dominant that competing vision is nevertheless still a part of Amer-
ican legal theory. The competing vision is that adjudication, includ-
ing constitutional adjudication, is an imperative act, not an 
interpretive act. According to this tradition, what might be called 
the "imperativist" tradition, the essence of adjudication, including 
constitutional adjudication, is the creation of law backed by force, 
not the interpretation of a pre-existing legal text guided by reason. 
Adjudication is an act of power, not of cognition. It is a branch of 
politics, not a branch of knowledge. Grey's claim and state-of-the-
art hermeneutic theory notwithstanding, these two conflicting tra-
ditions-one united around the claim that adjudication is interpre-
tive, and the other around the opposing claim that adjudication is 
imperative-are both still with us, and in one form or another have 
always been with us. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the 
imperativist-interpretivist debate could be heard in the competing 
tenets of the English legal positivists and the natural lawyers.s In 
the early twentieth century, the imperativist-interpretivist divide 
could be found in the competing theories and pedagogies of the 
legal formalists and the legal realists.6 In the second half of this 
5. The legal positivist's classic formulation (that law is "the command of 
the sovereign") is, of course, Austin's. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUD-
ENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 13-14 (1965). 
The sentiment is echoed in J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 31-33 (H.L.A. Hart 
ed. 1970). For the leading postivist's exposition of the interpretive-imperative debate, 
see J. BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERN-
MENT (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1977). For a modern review of the Blackstone-
Bentham debate, see H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE 
AND POLmCAL THEORY (1982). 
6. For the realists' exposition of the imperative-interpretive debate, see GRAY, 
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 
(1930); Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REv. 1, 109 (1912); Frank, Mr. 
Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 568 (1932); 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,459-62 (1897); Holmes, Ideals 
and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1915); Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REv. 40 
(1918); Hutcheson, Lawyer's Law and the Little, Small Dice, 7 IL. L. REv. I (1932); 
Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in 
the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 (1931); Pound, Mechanical 
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908). 
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century, we feel the same imperativist-interpretivist tension between 
the contrasting visions of the liberal legalists and at least a few (by 
no means most) of the critical legal scholars.7 
In this decade, though, and in this country, and in this legal culture 
(meaning law schools and law reviews), Grey is surely right. Interpre-
tivism-the view that adjudication is primarily an interpretive enter-
prise-dominates in the academy and in the law reviews; and 
imperativism-the view that adjudication is primarily an imperative 
enterprise-is declining. Today, it is indeed the case that most modern 
American legal theorists, and almost all modern constitutional theo-
rists, are interpretivists of one sort or another. This fact alone is 
significant but not really surprising. As Grant Gilmore observed in a 
different context,8 imperativism and interpretivism tend to come and 
go in waves, with one tradition dominating one generation's jurispru-
dential fancy, only to be supplanted in the next generation by some 
re-vamped version of the out-of-fashion minority view. 
What is surprising about our modern theory, I believe, is that 
the widely shared commitment to intepretivism has not generated a 
consensus on the nature and justification of adjudication itself. In 
fact, far from producing consensus, modern interpretivism is today 
a house badly divided-far more so than in its past. The rift is over 
the nature of interpretation. On the one hand, "objective interpre-
tivists" claim that interpretation-whether of legal, literary, or, 
indeed, "behavioral" texts-is a rational and objective enterprise.9 
When applied to legal theory, this turns out to be not just a 
descriptive claim about the nature of interpretation, but also a 
prescriptive claim about the morality of adjudication: its interpretive 
core gives adjudication both its rational persuasive power and its 
moral justification. "Subjective interpretivists," on the other hand, 
claim that interpretation of texts-whether of legal, literary, or 
behavioral texts-is "subjective," arational and "free," rather than 
bounded and objective. IO When applied to legal theory, this turns 
out, again, to be not just a descriptive claim about the nature of 
interpretation, but also a "debunking" claim about the purported 
morality of adjudication claimed by objectivists. Because interpre-
7. See generally Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Inter-
pretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1979); 
Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1502 
(1985); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 674-
75 (1983). 
8. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw (1977). 
9. See, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 
(1982); DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 119-181; R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1985). 
10. See, e.g., S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN Tms CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325 (1984); 
Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 645 (1985). 
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tation is subjective, legal interpretation, including adjudication, is 
also subjective. If the morality of adjudication depends on its 
objectivity, then while adjudication is indeed interpretive, as the 
objectivists correctly insist, this fact gains nothing: if morality 
requires objectivity, then adjudication cannot rely on its interpretive 
core for either its claim to rationality or for its moral justification. 
Thus, the distinctive feature of modern constitutional and legal 
theory is that the loudest debate is not between interpretivists and 
imperativists, but is instead between contending schools who agree 
that adjudication is an interpretive enterprise, and disagree over the 
nature and consequences of interpretation. According to the first 
. school, adjudication is objective and rational-and therefore mor-
ally defensible-because it is an interpretive enterprise, and inter-
pretation is objective and rational; according to the second school, 
adjudication is subjective and free-and therefore morally arbitrary 
-because adjudication is an interpretive enterprise, and interpreta-
tion itself is subjective and free. 
I will argue in this article against both modern forms of inter-
pretivism. The analogue of law to literature, on which much of 
modern interpretivism is based, although fruitful, has carried legal 
theorists too far. Despite a superficial resemblance to literary inter-
pretation, adjudication is not primarily an interpretive act of either 
a subjective or objective. nature; adjudication, including constitu-
tional adjudication, is an imperative act. Adjudication is in form 
interpretive, but in substance it is an exercise of power in a way 
which truly interpretive acts, such as literary interpretation, are not. 
Adjudication has far more in common with legislation, executive 
orders, administrative decrees, and the whimsical commands of 
princes, kings and tyrants than it has with other things we do with 
words, such as create or interpret novels. Like the commands of 
kings and the dictates of a majoritarian legislature, adjudication is 
imperative. It is a command backed by state power. No matter how 
many similarities adjudication has with literary linguistic activities, 
this central attribute distinguishes it. If we lose sight of the differ-
ence between literary interpretation and adjudication, and if we do 
not see that the difference between them is the amount of power 
wielded by the judiciary as compared to the power wielded by the 
interpreter, then we have either misconceived the nature of interpre-
tation, or the nature of law, or both. 
Furthermore, I will argue, the danger posed by interpretivist 
excesses is not simply conceptual confusion. By insisting that adju-
dication is interpretation, interpretivists misconceive not only the 
nature of adjudication, but also the nature, and even the possibility, 
of legal criticism. As a result, I will argue, both objective and 
subjective interpretivists dangerously undercut the viability of rad-
icallegal criticism-including radical critique of adjudication. Again, 
the problem sterns from an insistence on identity, where there is at 
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best similarity, between literary and legal enterprises. From literary 
critics, legal interpretivists have adopted the insight that normative 
criticism of any practice is necessarily interpretive. Criticism of a 
piece of literature, for example, is inevitably "interpretive" -saying 
how good a novel is inevitably entails declaring what it means-and 
an "interpretation" of a piece of literature is at the same time 
inevitably normative, or critical-when we try to say what a novel 
means, we aim for the best meaning we can give it according to 
some aesthetic theory of the nature of art. 1I According to this 
argument, the boundary between interpretive claims about the mean-
ing of a work of literature and critical claims about the value or 
merit of a work of literature-how good is it-is inevitably blurred. 
It is an easy step from this argument to the analogous position that 
criticism of law is also inevitably interpretive, and that an interpre-
tation of law is therefore inevitably critical. After all, if law is like 
literature, then whatever is true for literature ought also hold for 
law: critical claims about the value of a law are inextricably tied 
with claims about the law's meaning, and interpretive claims about 
its meaning are inevitably value laden. Finally, when this argument 
is coupled with the two claims that adjudication is interpretive, and 
that adjudication is law, they yield this sum: If both adjudication 
and criticism of adjudication-both the criticism of law as well as 
the creation of law-are interpretive, then the criticism of law and 
the creation of law turn out to be one and the same, or at least 
more similar than dissimilar. The result is that the distinction 
between the "law" that is and the moral ideal that ought to be 
becomes blurred, just as for the literary theorist, the distinction 
between literature and literary criticism has become blurred. 12 
It is one thing, though, to blur the divide between the creation 
and criticism of literature, and quite another to blur the distinction 
between the creation and criticism of law. Historically, the conse-
11. This argument forms the basis of Dworkin's view of adjudication as 
interpretation. See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 146. 
12. Dworkin, of course, regards this feature as the strength of his position: 
There is a better alternative: propositions of law are not merely descriptive 
of legal history, in a straightforward way, nor are they simply evaluative 
in some way divorced from legal history. They are interpretive of legal 
history, which combines elements of both description and evaluation but is 
different from both .... 
Lawyers would do well to study literary and other forms of artistic 
interpretation .... Not all of the battles within literary criticism are 
edifying or even comprehensible, but many more theories of interpretation 
have been defended in literature than in law, and these include theories 
which challenge the flat distinction between description and evaluation that 
has enfeebled legal theory. 
Id. at 147-48. 
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quence of the blending of the law and the moral basis from which 
we criticize law has almost always been a politically regressive 
insistence upon the morality of existing power;)3 and the present 
decade's fashionable denial of the difference between fact and value 
(whether indulged by the political left or by the political center) has 
proven to be no exception. The most obvious and compelling 
implication of the claim that there is no real difference between the 
law that is and the law that ought to be is that the law which is, is 
perfect: the law that is, is as it ought to be. The anti-positivist 
blurring of that which is from that which ought to be entails a non-
critical, accepting complacency with the status quo. 
The routes, of course, by which objectivists and subjectivists 
arrive at their shared conservatism, are drastically different from 
each other. Objectivism, I will argue, entails a conservative vision 
of the scope of legal criticism because it embraces a relativistic 
account of morality. Subjectivism, I will argue, entails a limited, 
regressive vision of the scope of legal criticism because it embraces 
a nihilistic account of morality (although not for the reasons most 
often put forward by objectivists). But the difference in the argu-
ments put forward by objective and subjective interpretivists has 
diverted attention from the incredible amount of ground that they 
share. They both view adjudication-or "law" -and criticism of 
adjudication as "interpretive" acts. By so doing, they tie the basis 
of legal criticism to "communicative texts" written or conceived by 
the community's collective or not-so-collective past. Accordingly 
they tie the use of power, as well as its critique, to the norms and 
ideals generated by the audible voices of our political history. As a 
consequence they both preclude on their own terms the possibility 
of a truly radical critique of power: a critique based on the norms 
and ideals generated not .by the audible voices of our political past, 
but instead by a "self" who has been trampled, not celebrated, by 
our history, and whose vision has been ignored, not expressed, in 
the collective "communicative texts" of our culture's political past. 
In order, partly, to demonstrate what I take to be the real value 
of literature to lawyers, I will argue that two works of literature 
themselves teach us the irresponsibility of viewing legal analysis as 
either an objective or subjective interpretive act. I will argue that 
the exploits of two fictional lawyers-Mark Twain's "Pudd'nhead 
13. Thus Bentham noted that the natural lawyer's identification of law with 
a higher morality almost always serves the ends of the powerful. See J. BENTHAM, 
A Commentary on Humphreys' Real Property Code, in 5 WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 389 (1962). H.L.A. Hart makes the same point in Hart, American 
Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, II GA. 
L. REv. 969 (1977). 
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Wilson" from the novel of the same name,14 and John Barth's Todd 
Andrews from The Floating OperalS-are illustrative of where, in 
my view, interpretivism has gone wrong. Thus, it is my contention 
that Mark Twain and John Barth have done important work for 
legal theorists: Twain's lawyer protagonist "Pudd'nhead Wilson" 
scrupulously follows the objective interpretive strategies of Ronald 
Dworkin's mythical and interpretive Hercules, yet he is no hero. 
And John Barth's lawyer protagonist Todd Andrews just as scru-
pulously lives out the assumptions of subjectivist interpretivism in 
his law practice in a small town on Maryland's Eastern Shore. Todd 
Andrews, similarly, is no hero; in fact, he constitutes a form of 
evil. These two works of fiction about lawyers and lawyering reveal 
important truths about interpretivism: both stories reveal "interpre-
tivism" to be a justificatory illusion. When we exercise power, 
through courts or otherwise, we must do better than Wilson and 
Andrews. We must do better than even the highest ideal of interpre-
tive behavior upon which our modern interpretivists insist. 
In Part Two I will argue that objective interpretivism, as defined 
in Owen Fiss's influential article Objectivity and Interpretation, 16 
should be rejected. Part Three argues that the danger of relativism 
posed by objective interpretivism is thematically explored in Mark 
Twain's legal novel Pudd'nhead Wilson. Part Four argues that 
subjective interpretivism, as expressed in a recent article by Stanley 
Fish entitled Anti-Professionalism,17 should be rejected because it 
rests on a nihilistic morality. Part Five argues that the dangers of 
subjective interpretivism are dramatized by the exploits of the 
protagonist Todd Andrews in John Barth's legal novel The Floating 
Opera. In the conclusion I will argue briefly that only by first 
focusing on the imperative core of adjudication can we state and 
clearly apply the moral criteria by which law should be criticized. 
II. OBJECTIVE INTERPRETIVISM 
Modern objective interpretivism (hereinafter "objectivism") is 
rooted in a fear of power. It is not power, objectivists claim, but 
wisdom tempered by the dictates of objective texts, that constitutes 
the essence of the adjudicative act. Adjudication cannot be power, 
because power is bad-power destroys-and adjudication is good. 
Adjudication, which is good, restrains power, which is bad. Thus, 
it is primarily a fear of power and distrust of politics that drives 
Fiss's modern attack on the deconstructionists: 
14. M. TWAIN, PUOD'NHEAD WILSON, reprinted in S. CLEMENS, PUOD'NHEAD 
WILSON AND THOSE EXTRAORDINARY TWINS (1980) [hereinafter TWAIN). 
15. J. BARTH, THE FLOATING OPERA (1967). 
16. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982). 
17. Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 645 (1986). 
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A recognition of the interpretive dimensions of adjudication and 
the dynamic character of all interpretive activity ... might enable 
us to come to terms with a new nihilism, one that doubts the. 
legitimacy of adjudication - a nihilism that appears to me to be 
unwarranted and unsound, but that is gaining respectability and 
claiming an increasing number of important and respected legal 
scholars, particularly in constitutional law. They have turned their 
backs on adjudication and have begun a romance with politics. 
This new nihilism might acknowledge the characterization of ad-
judication as interpretation, but then would insist that ... for any 
text ... there are any number of possible meanings, ... and that 
in the choosing of one of those meanings, . . . the judge will 
inevitably express his own values. All law is masked power. In this 
regard the new nihilism is reminiscent of the legal realism of the 
early twentieth century. It too sought to unmask what was claimed 
to be the true nature of legal doctrine. ... It saw law as a 
projection of the judge's values. IS 
This fear of power, both judicial and otherwise, is not new to 
modern objectivism. It echoes the natural lawyer's eighteenth and 
nineteenth century distrust of legal positivism, and the turn-of-the-
century formalistic reaction to the legal realists. Roscoe Pound 
expressed the same passionate distrust of power in his attack on the 
legal realists half a century ago: 
I suggest to you that so-called realism in jurisprudence is related 
to realism in art rather than to philosophical realism. Like realism 
in art it is a cult of the ugly .... An artist commissioned to paint 
the portrait of one of the outstanding judges of the recent past 
noted that he had a huge fist and a habit of holding it out before 
him. Accordingly, as a realist, he painted the fist elaborately in 
the foreground as the chief feature of the portrait, behind which, 
if one's gaze can get by the fist, one may discover in the back-
ground a thoughtful countenance. The judge did have such a fist 
and did hold it out in front of him on occasion. But having known 
him well for years, I doubt if anyone thought about it till the 
artist seized upon it and made it the main feature of his portrait. 
The fist existed. But was it the significant feature of the judge? 
Was reality in the sense of significance in the fist or in the 
countenance? 19 
For Fiss, no less than for Pound, the judge who simply wields 
power, who effectuates politics through adjudicative decisions, who 
uses his power to promote his own vision of our social ideal, is 
acting amorally or immorally: he is acting outside the parameters of 
the Rule of Law. In Fiss's view, such a creature constitutes an 
apocalyptic nightmare: he "threatens our social existence and the 
18. Fiss, supra note 16, at 740-41. 
19. R. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 90-91 (1951). 
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nature of public life as we know it in America, "20 and he "demeans 
our lives. "21 To return to Pound's metaphor, for the objectivist the 
appropriate symbol for power is the fist. Power is destructive. Like 
the fist, it has no constructive function. Like the fist, it lashes out 
and destroys. Fiss ends his piece by decrying our social future, 
should the imperativist implications of the new nihilism-subjectiv-
ism-ever come to be widely accepted: 
The great public text of modern America, the Constitution, would 
be drained of meaning. It would be debased. It would no longer 
be seen as embodying a public morality to be understood and 
expressed through rational processes like adjudication; it would be 
reduced to a mere instrument of political organization-distribut-
ing political power and establishing the modes by which that power 
will be exercised. Public values would be defined only as those 
held by the current winners in the processes prescribed by the 
Constitution; beyond that, there would be only individual morality, 
or even worse, individual interests. 
Against the nihilism that scoffs at the idea that the Constitu-
tion has any meaning, it is difficult to reason . . . . I believe it 
imperative to respond, ... for this nihilism calls into question the 
very point of constitutional adjudication; it threatens our social 
existence and the nature of public life as we know it in America; 
and it demeans our lives .... It must be combatted and can be, 
though perhaps only by affirming the truth of that which is being 
denied-the idea that the Constitution embodies a public morality 
and that a public life founded on that morality can be rich and 
inspiring. 22 
As noted above, this fear of unrestrained power is a familiar 
feature of the natural law tradition. What distinguishes modern 
objectivism from the rest of the natural law tradition-and what 
distinguishes Fiss from Pound-is the solution objectivism proposes 
to the problem of power. Unlike their natural law predecessors, 
modern objectivists insist that obedience to an authoritative legal 
text is the solution, and the only solution, to the problem of power 
posed by the "significance in the fist." Judicial obedience to legal 
text, the modern objectivist insists, will curb, legalize, restrain, and 
moralize "personal or partisan politics,' '23 the destructive exercise 
of power, and politically victorious "individual interests. "24 Obe-
20. Fiss, supra note 16, at 763. 
21. [d. 
22. [d. 
23. Thus, Dworkin argues that "[I)aw . . . conceived [as interpretation) is 
deeply and thoroughly political. Lawyers and judges cannot avoid politics in the 
broad sense of political theory. But law is not a matter of personal or partisan 
politics." R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 146 (emphasis added). 
24. Fiss, supra note 16, at 763. 
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dience to text is everything that power is not. Power is destructive, 
demeaning, irrational, arbitrary, immoral, and threatening to the 
community's life; while obedience to text, particularly to constitu-
tional text, is constructive, uplifting, comrnunitarian, moral and 
rational. The judge who interprets the objective text and fairly 
applies it protects our public morality, promotes the community's 
collective existence, and ensures that our collective existence has 
meaning and value. Judicial obedience to text transforms power 
into reason. It converts personal partisan politics into objective, 
communitarian wisdom. Obedience to an objective text thus purifies 
as it disciplines subjective power. The morality of obedience to the 
objective text of the constitution is a fundamental commitment that 
simply cannot be challenged: 
[W]hy must we respect the Constitution? [To] ... answer such a 
question ... one must transcend the text and the rules of inter-
pretation to justify the authority of the text; to justify the Consti-
tution itself or explain why the Constitution would be obeyed, one 
must move beyond law to political theory, if not religion. Such 
questioning can itself become a moment of crisis in the life of a 
Constitution, and since it is occasioned by a rigid insistence on 
the principles of positivism and the separation of law and morals, 
judges have an incentive to temper their commitment to that legal 
theory and thus to read the moral as well as the legal texLlS 
The judge's willingness to obey the mandates of objective texts 
is both the necessary and sufficient condition for the morality of 
adjudication itself. It morally justifies the judge's institutional au-
thority. Fiss puts the point this way: 
[A]n individual has a moral duty to obey a judicial interpretation 
... because the judge is part of an authority structure that is 
good to preserve. This version of the claim of authoritativeness 
speaks to the individual's conscience and derives from institutional 
virtue, rather than institutional power. It is the most important 
version of the claim of authoritativeness, because no society can 
heavily depend on force to secure compliance .. .. It vitally 
depends on a recognition of the value of judicial interpretation. 
Denying the worth of the Constitution, the place of constitutional 
values in the American system, or the judiciary's capacity to 
interpret the Constitution dissolves this particular claim to author-
itativeness. 26 
The judge who is properly engaged in constitutional adjudication 
is not exercising power-objective interpretation is the opposite of 
power. Rather, he is relinquishing power. He is engaging in an act 
of "civil obedience." But the judge who interprets and obeys texts 
25. [d. at 753-54. 
26. [d. at 756. 
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is no automaton; he is doing truly heroic and profoundly difficult 
intellectual and moral labor. Objective interpretation is as difficult 
as it is moral. Dworkin calls his interpretivist judge "Hercules" to 
underscore the dimensions of the task. Fiss captures the complexity 
of interpretation in this passage: 
A secure concept of the judicial role, and the priorities within that 
role, and a proper recognition of the source of legitimacy, may 
enable the judge to order and perhaps even reconcile tasks that 
may otherwise tend to conflict. The core of adjudication, objective 
interpretation, can be protected from the pressures of instrumen-
talism, as it can be protected from the tensions produced by the 
claim of authoritativeness. The multiple demands of adjudication 
often make law an elusive, partly realized ideal, for they mean the 
judge must manage and synthesize a number of disparate and 
conflicting roles-literary critic, moral philosopher, religious au-
thority, structural engineer, political strategist; but it would be 
wrong to abandon the ideal in the face of this challenge. The 
proper response is increased effort, clarity of vision and determi-
nation, not surrender. 27 
There are two problems with the modern objectivists' solution 
to the problem of power. The first problem might be called the 
problem of "moral contingency:" the morality of judicial obedience 
to an objective text depends entirely upon the morality of the 
objective text which is obeyed. An obedient, pliant attitude toward 
text is no more a guarantee against the evils of chaotic power than 
is fascism a moral alternative to anarchy. To borrow H.L.A. Hart's 
phrase, the "noble dream"28 of the objective interpreter can indeed 
become a nightmare. The second problem is the practical problem 
of "possibility:" objective interpretation can only guarantee moral 
decision-making if there is some means of ensuring that judges will 
indeed engage in it. The objectivist must, that is, specify how it is 
that the text, and not the judge's whim, generates the final judicial 
outcome. 
Objectivists have developed distinctive responses to both prob-
lems. First, modern objectivists know that the noble dream can 
become a nightmare. They know, even if they sometimes repress 
the knowledge, that the moral efficacy of obedience to legal text as 
a solution to the problem of power is dependent upon the morality 
of the legal text. South Africa, Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and 
the slave-holding South, if nothing else, have taught us that there 
is no moral guarantee in the idea of law.29 Yet, objectivists maintain 
27. [d. at 762. 
28. Hart, supra note 13. 
29. Thus, Dworkin makes clear in LAW'S EMPIRE that he rejects the natural 
lawyer's claim that an "unjust law is not a law," citing both the laws of South 
African apartheid and those of Nazi Germany as obvious counter-examples. See R. 
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 102-08 (1986). 
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their allegiance to legal text as the solution to the problem of power 
in the face of this knowledge. The first distinguishing feature of 
modern objectivism, therefore, has been its elaborate efforts to 
specify the "legal text" that judges ought to obey in such a way as 
to make plausible their claim that obedience to law's mandates will 
ensure the morality of adjudicatory power. 
They begin by denying allegiance to older views which bear a 
strong but misleading resemblance to objectivism. Thus, "strict 
constructionists" identify the text narrowly with the intent of the 
framers while "textualists" identify the text as the written document 
itself. But both of these positions fail, and it has been modern 
objectivists who have made clear why: the framers, no matter how 
much we ought respect them, were neither Kings nor Gods; there is 
no good reason for thinking that obedience to their commands will 
ensure the moral purity of judicial actions. The document itself is 
just that-a legal document-not a sacred text. There is no good 
reason to worship it, no matter how understandable may be the 
impulse to do SO.30 
For these reasons, objectivists have rejected an identification of 
the "text" to be obeyed with either original intent or literal meaning, 
and have carved out instead a third alternative: the "text" (including 
the constitutional text) which can morally purify judicial power, 
and the interpretation of which constitutes the core of adjudication, 
must embrace society's conventional morality. This position might 
be called "supplementalism." The appeal of supplementalism is 
obvious. If a "legal text" includes the community's moral code (as 
well as the community's statutes, precedents, and constitutions) and 
if the community's moral code is as close as one can possibly get 
to moral truth (or even better if it is moral truth), then adjudication 
conceived as interpretation is moral. Supplementalism is precisely 
the claim that is needed to transform the "rationality" that is 
obedience into a rationality that is noble and virtuous. 31 
30. The critical attack by modern interpretivists on strict constructionists and 
textualists is vast and, I am sure, all too familiar. See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 
154-58, 162-64; Brest, The Misconceived Quest jor the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980). On Constitution worship in general, and its relation to 
modern interpretivist movements, see Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. 
L. REv. 1,3 n.4 (1984). 
31. Supplementalism, however, spawns problems of its own. One is causal: 
How did the law come to be supplemented with the community's moral code? The 
mUltiplicity and inconsistency of the metaphors used to explain this process of 
supplementation rather starkly reveal the interpretivists' uncertainty-is public, con-
ventional morality read into the constitution, or does it emanate from it? Is it a 
separate "social text" which the judge is morally but not legally bound to abide by, 
or is it an addendum incorporated by reference into a contract? For some of the 
theorists, these are apparently not mutually exclusive alternatives. Fiss, for example, 
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It is the second problem, however-the charge that it is not 
possible to constrain a judge, even a well-meaning judge, to the 
objective meaning to be gleaned from a text-which has become the 
modern battbground for objectivism. Objective interpretation of 
the legal text is made possible, Fiss argues, by the existence of 
"disciplining rules" that narrow the range of interpretive discretion 
open to any particular judicial interpreter: 
[T]he freedom of the interpreter is not absolute. The interpreter is 
not free to assign any meaning he wishes to the text. He is 
disciplined by a set of rules that specify the relevance and weight 
to be assigned to the material, ... as well as by those that define 
basic concepts and that established the procedural circumstances 
under which the interpretation must occur .... [Disciplining rules] 
constrain the interpreter, thus transforming the interpretive process 
from a subjective to an objective one, and they furnish the 
standards by which the correctness of the interpretation can be 
judged. These rules are not simply standards or principles held by 
individual judges, but instead constitute the institution . . . in 
which judges find themselves and through which they act. The 
disciplining rules operate similarly to the rules of language, which 
constrain the users of the language, furnish the standards for 
judging the uses of language, and constitute the language. 32 
Acquiescence in the disciplining rules is a necessary condition to 
participation in the "interpretive practice" that constitutes adjudi-
cation: 
seems to endorse both positions. Public morality is a "prism" through which judges 
read the constitution, but furthermore, the Constitution itself establishes-positivist-
ically, if you will-certain values which are and must be regarded as fundamental. 
Its fundamental justness cannot be questioned: 
Positivism tries to separate law from morals, ... but the separation will 
... never be complete. Two forces modulate the separation .... The first 
derives from the fact that the judge is trying to give meaning and expression 
to public values (those that are embodied in a legal text) and that his 
understanding of such values-equality, liberty, property, due process, cruel 
and unusual punishment-is necessarily shaped by the prevailing morality. 
The moral text is a prism through which he understands the legal text. The 
second force relates to an intellectual dilemma of positivism: A too rigid 
insistence on positivism will inevitably bring into question the ultimate 
moral authority of the legal text-the justness of the Constitution. 
Fiss, supra note 16, at 753. However it is that the Constitution becomes permeated 
with moral values, Fiss, like Dworkin, is clear that it is indeed so permeated. He is 
also clear that it is by virtue of the incorporation of public morality, or values, into 
the legal text that obedience to that text is a moral act: "The idea of adjudication 
requires that there exist constitutional values to interpret, just as much as it requires 
that there be constraints on the interpretive process. Lacking such a belief, adjudi-
cation is not possible, only power." Id. at 763. 
32. Id. at 744. 
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Rules are not rules unless they are authoritative, and that authority 
can only be conferred by a community. Accordingly, the disciplin-
ing rules that govern an interpretive activity must be seen as 
defining or demarcating an interpretive community consisting of 
those who recognize the rules as authoritative . . . . [I]n law the 
interpretive community is a reality. It has authority to confer 
because membership does not depend on agreement. Judges do 
not belong to an interpretive community as a result of shared 
views "about particular issues or interpretations, but belong by 
virtue of a commitment to uphold and advance the rule of law 
itself. They belong by virtue of their office. There can be many 
schools of literary interpretation but . . . in legal interpretation 
there is only one school and attendance is mandatory. All judges 
define themselves as members of this school and must do so in 
order to exercise the prerogatives of their office. Even if their 
personal commitment to the rule of law wavers, the rule continues 
to act on judges; even if the rule of law fails to persuade, it can 
coerce. Judges know that if they relinquish their membership in 
the interpretive community, or deny its authority, they love their 
right to speak with the authority of the law.33 
217 
Thus, substantive supplementation of the text with the commu-
nity's values solves the problem of moral contingency, while the 
existence and operation of disciplining rules solve the problem of 
possibility. Disciplining rules facilitate interpretation of the legal 
text, while supplementation of the text with values moralizes the 
act. By virtue of the disciplining rules that constrain discretion, 
adjudication is an interpretive a,ct of reason rather than an act of 
power, and "by virtue of the values that supplement the text to be 
interpreted, it is an act of morality rather than politics. The objec-
tivist thesis, then, is this: properly understood, adjudication is the 
disciplined interpretation oj a supplemented legal text. It is by virtue 
of its substantive supplementation and its procedural discipline that 
it is a morally justified practice. 
However, even assuming its coherence, objectivism thus de-
fined-the view that adjudication consists of the disciplined inter-
pretation of a supplemented, objective legal text-does not do what 
Fiss hopes: it does not transform acts of amoral power into acts 
of moral reason. It may indeed transform an act of power into an 
act of reason, but this does not necessarily translate into a gain in 
morality. For the conventional morality, or the "public morality," 
with which the supplementalists gloss the legal text is not the same 
as true morality: there is no guarantee that the conventional code 
of virtue to which a community subscribes is a moral "one. It might 
be felt as moral and in fact be horrific. The same is true of a 
disciplining rule. Supplementing the text of the Constitution with 
33. [d. at 745. 
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the conventional morality of the community does not confer upon 
the Constitution any mantle of moral wisdom, and constraining the 
act of interpretation with disciplining rules may transform an 
adjudicative act into an interpretive act, but it does not transform 
an interpretive act into a moral act. Substantive supplementation 
confers upon the court only the wisdom of the community, which 
may be no wisdom at all; and obedience to rules of discipline 
derived from community practice imposes upon the judge obliga-
tions commensurate with the community's practices, which mayor 
may not be just. Objective interpretivism does indeed guarantee the 
interpreter a modicum of popularity, or success, in the community. 
It ensures that Dworkin's Hercules will be loved, in spite of the 
fact that he was not elected. But it does not guarantee that his 
decisions will be just, or that his actions will be good. 
Fiss has anticipated at least part of this objection. He knows, 
and even insists, that the degree of "objectivity" he is describing 
is relative: 
[T]he objective quality of interpretation is bounded, limited, or 
relative. It is bounded by the existence of a community that 
recognizes and adheres to the disciplining rules used by the inter-
preter and that is defined by its recognition of those rules. The 
objectivity of the physical world may be more transcendent, less 
relativistic, ... but as revealed by the reference to language and 
the disciplining rules of interpretation, the physical does not 
exhaust the claim of objectivity, nor does it make this bounded 
objectivity of interpretation a secondary or parasitic kind of 
objectivity. Bounded objectivity is the only kind of objectivity to 
which the law-or any interpretive activity-ever aspires and the 
only one about which we care. To insist on more, to search for 
the brooding omnipresence in the sky, is to create a false issue. 34 
But unfortunately, Fiss fails to address the obvious implication of 
his concession, which is just this: If the source of adjudicative 
morality is its objectivity, and if objectivity is relative, then the 
morality of adjudication is relative as well. Thus what Fiss concedes 
of objectivity must also be conceded of morality, and Fiss's crucial 
penultimate sentence so amended becomes this-"Bounded morality 
is the only kind of morality to which the law ... aspires and the 
only one about which we care." But this is just wrong: bounded 
morality is not the only kind of morality to which the law ever 
aspires, and bounded morality is not the only one about which we 
care. Moral relativism is no alternative to the moral nihilism Fiss 
fears in subjectivism. The claim that it is, I think, rests upon an 
optimism regarding "community," and more specifically our own 
historical community, which is simply unwarranted. Surely, from 
the perspective of those most in need of the law's protection-
34. [d. at 745-46. 
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slaves, women, workers, children, the poor, the illiterate, the 
uneducated, dissidents and other members of that vast and silenced 
majority whom the "community" in its relative moral wisdom has 
at one time or another cast off-a relativism that ties justice to 
community norms and practices is as odious and even frightening 
as the "nihilism" Fiss imagines he sees in the deconstructive 
instincts of his opponents. 
My claim, then, is simply that the supplemental strategy of 
modern objectivism is marred by an undue optimism regarding 
community (as well as an undue pessimism regarding power). 
Objectivism indeed gives us a somewhat counter-positivist means 
by which to criticize adjudicative outcomes. According to objectiv-
ism's current supplementalist strategies, we can and should test 
substantive legal outcomes against the community's moral code. 
We can criticize its procedures against the community's interpretive 
practices, and if we discover that an act of adjudication does not 
accord with the community's moral sense or that the process breaks 
a disciplining rule, we can, if objectivism is right, infer from either 
fact that the decision is legally as well as morally wrong. If the 
Constitution incorporates the community's conventional morality 
and its interpretive practices by reference, then the adjudicative 
decision which incorrectly reads the conventional morality or the 
conventional rules will be as wrong, legally, as the decision which 
incorrectly reads the statute book. As progressive strategy, this 
enrichment of legal norms might be helpful and then again it might 
backfire, and badly. It might be progressive or regressive-explicitly 
depending upon the community's present moral mood. But which-
ever it is, we should be clear that legal enrichment of legal norms 
is all that supplementalism entails. The decision that is out of kilter 
with the community's moral sense (and therefore an "illegal" 
decision) is not necessarily an immoral decision, and a decision 
that is in accord with the community'S conventional morality and 
conventional rules of reasoning is not necessarily morally righteous. 
Supplementing the legal text with the conventional morality of the 
community, and insisting upon judicial acceptance of such a sup-
plemented text, might insure judicial popularity; it might, that is, 
ensure judicial stability. It does not, however, ensure judicial virtue. 
Relativism is not a moral alternative to what Fiss perceives, either 
rightly or wrongly, to be the spectre of nihilism, regardless of 
whether or not it is politic. 
III. INTERPRETATION, POPULARITY AND FOLLY: CONVENTIONAL 
MORALITY AND PUDD'NHEAD WILSON 
Mark Twain's legalistic novel Pudd'nhead Wilson35 takes place 
in an interpretive community and as such it has a lot to teach 
35. TWAIN, supra note 14. 
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about the relative virtues of interpretive practices. The interpretive 
community in this novel is a small town-"the town of Dawson's 
Landing, on the Missouri side of the Mississippi. "36 The business 
district is just one street, six blocks long, where' 'three brick stores 
three stories high towered above interjected bunches of little frame 
shops. "37 It is, Twain tells us, a "slave-holding town, with a rich 
slave-worked grain and pork country back of it. "38 The "chief 
citizen" of the town is a judge of the county court: York Driscoll, 
of Virginian ancestry, and a gentleman. 39 The second citizen is a 
lawyer, Pembroke Howard, another "old Virginian grandee with 
proved descent from the First Families, "40 also a gentleman and an 
authority on the "Code." As the identity of its chief citizens 
reveals, the town respects its judges and lawyers immensely, and 
takes its law and its legal rights very seriously indeed. 
Further, as Dworkin and Fiss would have it, the town's "law" 
which it holds in such high regard is by no means merely the 
positivistic legal enactments found in statute books, case reports, 
and constitutional documents. The "law" of Dawson's Landing is 
supplemented by the town's conventional morality. Thus supple-
mented, it is in constant need of interpretation. That interpretation, 
in turn, requires "disciplining rules." In fact, the positive "law" 
of Dawson's Landing is supplemented with at least three "social 
texts" and is interpreted in accord with at least three "disciplining 
rules" of interpretation. 
The first supplemental text-and to the reader the most ob-
vious-is the town's "Code of Honor," which governs relations 
among the town's nobility. According to the Code of Honor, a man 
is responsible not for his individual commission of legally proscribed 
acts, but for the honor of his family name. Where the Code of 
Honor conflicts with positive law, the Code of Honor prevails. 
Twain spells out the disciplining rule that governs the interpretative 
practices of the nobility-and hence the interpretation of the Code 
of Honor-explicitly: 
In Missouri a recognized superiority attached to any person who 
hailed from Old Virginia; and this superiority was exalted to 
supremacy when a person of such nativity could also prove descent 
from the First Families of that great commonwealth. The Howards 
and Driscolls were of this aristocracy. In their eyes it was a 
nobility. It had its unwritten laws, and they were as clearly defined 
and as strict as any that could be found among the printed statutes 
36. [d. at 3. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. at 4. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. 
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of the land. The F.F.V. was born a gentleman; his highest duty 
in life was to watch over that great inheritance and keep it 
unsmirched. He must keep his honor spotless. Those laws were his 
chart .... These laws required certain things of him which his 
religion might forbid: then his religion must yield - the laws 
could not be relaxed to accommodate religion or anything else. 
Honor stood first; and the laws defined what it was and wherein 
it differed, in certain details, from honor as defined by church 
creeds and by the social laws and customs of some of the minor 
divisions of the globe that had got crowded out when the sacred 
boundaries of Virginia were staked out. 41 
221 
Second, and more important to the plot, the community's pos-
itive law is supplemented by the Racial Code, which governs rela-
tions between slaves-or, more accurately, "niggers" -and whites. 
The primary disciplining rule of the Racial Code (although nowhere 
explicitly stated) is that "niggers are guilty" and that slavery is 
their punishment. But unlike the disciplining rule governing the 
Code of Honor, Twain does not give us a direct recitation of this 
rule. Instead, he sets the plot around it. Thus, Twain begins the 
novel with a series of interpretations of the Racial Code, all of 
which are facilitated by its implicit disciplining rule. First, the novel 
opens with a white owner's legal interpretation of a behavioral text. 
A slave-owner accuses his slaves of a petty theft. The owner's 
interpretation of the slave's act and its appropriate sanction is 
"disciplined" by the owner's understanding not just of the law of 
property and the positive prohibition against larceny, but of that 
law "supplemented" by the disciplining rule of black gUilt and its 
punishment of slavery: 
Driscoll's patience was exhausted. He was a fairly humane man, 
toward slaves and other animals; he was an exceedingly humane 
man toward the erring of his own race. Theft he could not abide, 
and plainly there was a thief in the house. Necessarily the thief 
must be one of his Negroes. He called his servants before him 
.... "You have all been warned before. It has done no good. 
This time I will teach you a lesson. I will sell the thief. Which of 
you is the guilty one?" 
"I give you one minute" ... "if at the end of that time you have 
not confessed, I will not only sell all four of you, but-I will sell 
you DOWN THE RIVER!"42 
Twain next describes the slaves' interpretation of Driscoll's 
threat-itself, of course, a command backed by sanction, and thus 
itself a legal text. The slaves' interpretation of the legal text "I will 
41. [d. at 58. 
42. [d. at 9-10 (emphasis added). 
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sell you down the river!" no less than Driscoll's interpretation of 
the slaves' act, is disciplined by, and thereby facilitated by, the 
"disciplining rule" that governs the Racial Code; to wit, that 
"niggers are guilty": 
It was equivalent to condemning them to hell! No Missouri 
negro doubted this .. .. Tears gushed from their eyes, their 
supplicating hands went up, and three answers came in the one 
instant: 
"I done it!" 
"I done it!" 
"I done it!" . . . "Very good," said the master, . . . "I will 
sell you here, though you don't deserve it. You ought to be sold 
down the river." 
The culprits flung themselves prone, in an ecstasy of gratitude, 
and kissed his feet, declaring that they would never forget his 
goodness .... They were sincere, for like a god he had stretched 
forth his mighty hand and closed the gates of hell against them. 
He knew, himself, that he had done a noble and gracious thing, 
and he was privately well pleased with his magnanimity; and that 
night he set the incident down in his diary, so that his son might 
read it in after years and be thereby moved to deeds of gentleness 
and humanity himself .... 43 
The one slave of the four who had not committed the theft, and 
was therefore not sold in retaliation, alone understands Driscoll's 
words for what they are: an act of power. Only Roxy, who becomes 
a major character, fully understands and acts upon the imperative 
import of Driscoll's spoken threat: 
Percy Driscoll slept well the night he saved his house-minions from 
going down the river, but no wink of sleep visited Roxy's eyes. A 
profound terror had taken possession of her. Her child could grow 
up and be sold down the river! The thought crazed her with 
horror. 44 
Roxy responds to Driscoll's threat by switching her own mulatto 
baby-who is a nigger, but is to all appearances white-with the 
Master's baby under her care, so as to ensure that her own baby 
will never be "sold down the river." Her moral justification for this 
act, both to herself and to God, is facilitated by her interpretation 
of an anecdote related by a preacher, in which a white nigger-an 
English servant girl-had done the same thing. Roxy's interpretation 
of the preacher's text depends upon the disciplining rule that white 
people are innocent: 
" 'Tain't no sin-white folks has done it! It ain't no sin, glory to 
goodness it ain't no sin! Dey's done it-yes, en dey was de biggest 
43. [d. at 12 (emphasis added). 
44. [d. at 12-13. 
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quality in de whole bilin', too-Kings!" ... De preacher said it 
was jist like dey done in Englan' one time, long time ago. De queen 
she lef' her baby layin' aroun' one day, en went out callin'; en one 
0' de niggers roun' 'bout de place dat was mos' white, she come in 
en see de chile layin' aroun', en tuck en put her own chile's clo'es 
on de queen's chile, en put de queen's chile's clo'es on her own 
chile, en den lef' her own chile layin' aroun' en tuck en toted de 
queen's chile home to de nigger quarter, en nobody ever foun' it 
out, en her chile was de king, bimeby, en sole de queen's chile 
down de river one time when dey had to settle up de estate. Dah, 
now, ... it ain't no sin, caze white folks done it. Dey done it-
yes, dey done it; en not on'y jis' common white folks, nuther, but 
de biggest quality dey is in de whole bilin'. "45 
223 
And third, the town's law is supplemented (or comes to be 
supplemented) by the familiar substantive parameters of legal liber-
alism, and comes to be interpreted in light of the familiar liberal-
legalistic "disciplining rule" of individual responsibility: legal guilt 
or innocence attaches to an individual person by virtue of his 
commission of a legally proscribed act. At least at the beginning of 
the novel, however, this final and to our eyes most familiar disciplin-
ing rule is a hostile and foreign element in the town's interpretive 
practices. It is brought to the community from the outside by the 
novel's protagonist-an eastern-trained, eastern-born lawyer, David 
Wilson. Over the course of the novel, the community comes to accept 
Wilson as a lawyer, and comes to accept the legalistic individualism 
he propounds. But the town's initially hostile reaction to Wilson's 
brand of legalistic individualism is neatly conveyed in the novel's 
first explicit act of interpretation. Wilson tries to tell a joke, and the 
community's overly literal interpretation casts Wilson and his legal-
istic individualism as the outsider: 
In ... February Dawson's Landing gained a new citizen. This 
was Mr. David Wilson, a young fellow of Scotch parentage. He 
had wandered to this remote region from his birth-place in the 
interior of the State of New York, to seek his fortune. He was 
twenty-five years old, college bred, and had finished a post-college 
course in an eastern law school a couple of years before. 
He was a homely, freckled, sandy-haired young fellow, with an 
intelligent blue eye that had frankness and comradeship in it and a 
covert twinkle of a pleasant sort. But for an unfortunate remark of 
his, he would no doubt have entered at once upon a successful 
career at Dawson's Landing .... He had just made the acquaint-
ance of a group of citizens when an invisible dog began to yelp and 
snarl and howl and make himself very comprehensibly disagreeable, 
whereupon young Wilson said, much as one who is thinking aloud-
"I wish I owned half of that dog." 
45. [d. at 15. 
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"Why?" somebody asked. 
"Because I would kill my half." 
[Vol. 54 
The group searched his face with curiosity, with anxiety even, 
but found no light there, no expression that they could read. They 
fell away from him as from something uncanny, and went into 
privacy to discuss him. One said -
" 'Pears to be a fool." 
" 'Pears?" said another. "/s, I reckon you better say." 
"Said he wished he owned half of the dog, the idiot," said a 
third. "What did he reckon would become of the other half if he 
killed his half? Do you reckon he thought it would live?" 
"Why, he must have thought it, unless he is the downrightest 
fool in the world; because if he hadn't thought that, he would have 
wanted to own the whole dog, knowing that if he killed his half 
and the other half died, he would be responsible for that half, just 
the same as if he had killed that half instead of his own. Don't it 
look that way to you, gents?" 
"In my opinion the man ain't in his right mind." 
"In my opinion he hain't got any mind." 
"I'm with you gentlemen," ... it ain't going too far to say he 
is a pudd'nhead. If he ain't a pudd'nhead, I ain't no judge, that's 
all." 
Mr. Wilson stood elected .... Within a week he had lost his 
first name; Pudd'nhead took its place .... That first day's verdict 
made him a fool, and he was not able to get it set aside, or even 
modified. The nickname soon ceased to carry any harsh or un-
friendly feeling with it, but it held its place, and was to continue to 
hold its place for twenty long years. 
[H]is deadly remark had ruined his chance-at least in the law. 
No clients came. [He] offered his services now in the humble 
capacities of land surveyor and expert accountant . . . . With Scotch 
patience and pluck he resolved to live down his reputation and work 
his way into the legal field yet. 46 
As modern interpretivists insist, legal interpretation is only one 
interpretive practice among many, and Dawson's Landing bears this 
out. The interplay of its three disciplining rules-(1) that individuals 
are responsible for their actions, (2) that the nobility are responsible, 
primarily, for their family's honor, and (3) that niggers are collec-
tively guilty-governs the interpretation of a wide range of "texts"-
not just legal texts. Most importantly, these supplementing Codes 
and the disciplining rules that regulate them also govern the interpre-
tation of the various texts by which a "person" is demarcated. Thus, 
the primary "sub-text" according to which "identity" for purposes 
46. [d. at 5-6. 
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of the first rule of responsibility-individual responsibility for legally 
prescribed actions-is established, is the b(Jdy: continuity of physical 
identity. In the novel's climactic court scene, Pudd'nhead Wilson 
describes to the awestruck courtroom audience how the body can be 
read as a text so as to establish the physically continuous identity 
across time that is the necessary condition for legal and liberal 
responsibility: 
"Every human being carries with him from his cradle to his 
grave certain physical marks which do not change their character, 
and by which he can always be identified-and that without shade 
of doubt or question. These marks are his signature, his physiolog-
ical autograph, so to speak, and this autograph cannot be counter-
feited, nor can he disguise it or hide it away, nor can it become 
illegible by the wear and the mutations of time. This signature is 
not his face ... it is not his height, ... it is not his form, .... 
This autograph consists of the delicate lines or corrugations 
with which Nature marks the insides of the hands and the soles of 
the feet. If you will look at the balls of your fingers ... you will 
observe that these dainty, curving lines lie close together, like those 
that indicate the borders of oceans in maps, and· that they form 
various clearly defined patterns, . . . and that these patterns differ 
on the different fingers .... The patterns on the right hand are 
not the same as those on the left. One twin's patterns are never the 
same as his fellow-twin's patterns. . . . . 
"For more than twenty years 1 have amused my compulsory 
leisure with collecting these curious physical signatures in this town 
.... There is hardly a person in this room, white or black, whose 
natal signature 1 cannot produ<;e, and not one of them can so 
disguise himself that 1 cannot pick him out from a multitude of his 
fellow creatures and unerringly identify him by his hands .... 
"I have studied some of these signatures so much that 1 know 
them as well as the bank cashier knows the autograph of his oldest 
customer. While 1 turn my back, now, 1 beg that several persons 
will be so good as to pass their fingers through their hair and then 
press them upon one of the panes of the window near the jury, and 
that among them the accused may set their finger-marks." 
... Then, upon call, Wilson went to the window, made his 
examination, and said -
"This is Count Luigi's right hand .... Here is Count Angelo's -
right. 
... Am 1 right?" 
A deafening explosion of applause was the answer. The Bench 
said -
"This certainly approaches the miraculous! "47 
47. [d. at 108-110. 
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The "text" for reading noble identity, as opposed to individual 
identity, is not the body, but title and surname; as it is family 
membership, not one's indIvidual history for which, according to the 
Code of Honor, one is responsible. Thus York Driscoll, the Judge 
and eventual murder victim, was "proud of his old Virginian ances-
try, and in his hospitalities and his rather formal and stately manners 
he kept up its traditions. He was fine, and just, and generous. To 
be a gentleman-a gentleman without stain or blemish-was his only 
religion, and to it he was always faithful."48 Similarly, Twain intro-
duces Pembroke Howard, lawyer and bachelor, "another old Virgin-
ian grandee with proved descent from the First Families. He was a 
fine, brave, majestic creature, a gentleman according to the nicest 
requirements of the Virginian rule.' '49 The Italian twins who play the 
foil to Tom's villainry (and become Pudd'nhead's clients, wrongly 
accused of murder), explain their noble identity in the same familial 
terms: "Our parents were well-to-do, there in Italy, and we were 
their only child. We were of the old Florentine nobility."50 In this 
passage, the community interprets the text of the twins' surname: 
None of these visitors was at ease, but being honest people, 
they didn't pretend to be. None of them had ever seen a person 
bearing a title of nobility before, and none had been expecting to 
see one now, consequently the title came upon them as a kind of 
pile-driving surprise and caught them unprepared. A few tried to 
rise to the emergency, and got out an awkward My Lord, or Your 
lordship, or something of the sort, but the great majority were 
overwhelmed by the unaccustomed word and its dim and awful 
associations with gilded courts and stately ceremony and anointed 
kingship, so they only fumbled through the handshake, and passed 
on, speechless.51 
One's racial identity, by contrast to both liberal and noble 
identity, is neither a matter of individual continuity (race constitutes 
a collective, not an individual identity) nor is it a matter of family 
name (as the characters in this novel often remark, niggers have no 
surname). Thus, when Roxy tells the grown Tom that he is in fact 
her son, her message is clear: for purposes of guilt and for purposes 
of determining who can and who can't be sold down the river, it is 
blood line and racial heritage-not upbringing, family name, or 
continuity of physical identity-that constitutes the relevant text by 
which identity is determined: 
"Yassir, en dat ain't all! You is a nigger!-bawn a nigger en a 
slave! - en you's a nigger en a slave dis minute; en if I opens my 
48. [d. at 4. 
49. [d. 
50. [d. at 27. 
51. /d. at 29. 
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mouf, ole Marse Driscoll'll sell you down de river befo' you is two 
days older den what you is now!" . . . 
"It ain't no lie, nuther. It's jes' de truth, en noth'n but de 
truth, so he'p me. Yassir-you's my son-. ... 
. . . "[e]n dat po' boy dat you's been a kickin' en a cuffin' to-
day is Percy Driscoll's son en yo' marster .... en his name's Tom 
Driscoll en yo' name's Vallet de Chambers, en you ain't got no 
fambly name, becaze niggers don't have 'em!"S2 
227 
In one of the great interpretive triumphs of the novel, Roxy 
renders a masterful interpretation of Tom's egregious behavior. Her 
interpretation takes account of the discipline rules that govern blood-
line, racial group, and family name: 
It's de nigger in you, dat's what it is. Thirty-one parts 0' you is 
white, en on'y one part nigger, en dat po' little one part is yo' soul. 
'Tain't wuth savin'; 'tain't wuth totin' out on a shovel en tho'in' 
in de gutter. You has disgraced yo' birth. What would yo' pa [(a 
member of the white nobility)] think 0' you? It's enough to make 
him turn in his grave." ... 
"What ever has 'come 0' yo' Essex blood? Dat's what I can't 
understan'. En it ain't only jist Essex blood dat's in you, not by a 
long sight-'deed it ain't! My great-great-great-gran'father en yo' 
great-great-great-great-gran'father was ole Cap'n John Smith, de 
highes' blood dat Ole Virginny ever turned out; en his great-great-
gran'mother or somers along back dah, was Pocahontas de Injun 
queen, en her husbun' was a nigger king outen Africa-en yit here 
you is, a slinkin' outen a duel en disgracin' our whole line like a 
ornery low-down hound! Yes, it's de nigger in you .... 
"Ain't nigger enough in him to show in his finger-nails, en dat 
takes mightly little-yit dey's enough to paint his soul. ... Yassir, 
enough to paint a whole thimbleful of 'em."S3 
Twain leaves no doubt as to the relationship between supplemental 
social text and positivistic legal text. The supplemental texts and the 
disciplining rules that govern them-of individual responsibility for 
one's own acts, of black collective guilt, and of noble responsibility 
for family honor-do indeed constitute the moral prism through 
which the community's legal texts are interpreted. Pudd'nhead's 
climactic triumph in the book's final courtroom scene evidences this 
relationship, and also evidences Pudd'nhead's understanding of this 
fundamental law of interpretation. In a narrow sense, the novel 
celebrates the "Rule of Law": the "guilty" party is convicted, and 
is convicted by virtue of Pudd'nhead's interpretive prowess. However, 
Pudd'nhead does not achieve his legal triumph by convincing the 
community to abandon its noxious noble and racial codes in favor 
52. Id. at 41. 
53. Id. at 70. 
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of the morally preferable legalistic code of individual responsibility. 
At no point does he try to move the community to abandon its 
conceptions of racial gUilt and familial nobility. Rather, what Pudd'n-
head achieves is a Dworkinian, or Herculean, interpretive triumph: 
he convinces the town of Tom's guilt by interpreting the legal text 
prohibiting murder through the "prism" of the community's disci-
plining rules of race and family. Pudd'nhead triumphs at the book's 
conclusion, not by transforming the community's sense of law so as 
to match the liberal norms with which it has come into conflict, but 
rather through a masterful, even Herculean, act of interpretation. 
Pudd'nhead reads the legal text through the prism of the community's 
norms. He is truly a Dworkinian legal hero. 
Pudd'nhead begins his case by explaining to the courtroom the 
means by which the body's "text"-or fingerprints-can be read so 
as to discover the historical continuity necessary to the liberal and 
legalistic notion of responsibility, on which legal liability rests. He 
then "reads"-or interprets-a range of fingerprints to demonstrate 
to the openly admiring spectators that the charged defendants, his 
clients, did not commit the murder. The fingerprints on the murder 
weapon, the knife, do not match the twins' fingerprints. After first 
explaining the phenomenon of fingerprints-the text of continuous 
physical identity-and demonstrating to the crowd's awestruck satis-
faction that his clients are not "physically continuous" with the 
murderer who held the knife, Wilson concludes with a flourish: 
"These men are innocent-I have no further concern with them. "54 
Wilson then turns to the next question: Who did murder the 
judge? Put aside, for now, the answer; the question is more complex 
than it appears. The question is complex because it involves conflict-
ing disciplinary rules of the relevant interpretive community. In terms 
of physical continuity, the human being raised as "Tom" and known 
by the community as "Tom" committed the murder, and Wilson 
comes to Court prepared to prove as much. Thus, the answer to the 
legal and liberal question of who (where "who" now means what 
"physically continuous person") committed the murder is clearly 
"Tom," and Wilson comes prepared to prove it by reading the. text 
of the physical body: the fingerprints on the murder weapon are the 
same as the fingerprints on the person known as Tom. 
But he never has to. Wilson begins appropriately enough: he 
begins by emphasizing the legal-liberal meaning of continuous phys-
ical identity, and the legal-liberal meaning of "guilt" as responsibility 
for one's deeds which it implicates: 
"May it please the court, the claim given the front place, the claim 
most persistently urged, the claim most strenuously and I may even 
54. [d. at 111. 
HeinOnline -- 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 229 1986-1987
1987] INTERPRETATION 
say, aggressively and defiantly insisted upon by the prosecution, is 
this-that the person whose hand left the blood-stained finger-prints 
upon the handle of the Indian knife is the person who committed 
the murder .... We grant that claim . ... " 
"Upon this haft stands the assasin's natal autograph, written in 
the blood of that helpless and unoffending old man who loved you 
and whom you all loved. There is but one man in the whole earth 
whose hand can duplicate that crimson sign. "55 
229 
But the question "who" -whether "who committed the murder" 
or "whose hand can duplicate that crimson sign" - is simply 
ambiguous, and it is in response to the ambiguity that Wilson's 
interpretive prowess emerges. For Wilson must be careful to answer 
the question "who" not only by reference to disciplining rules of 
legal liberalism but also in light of the disciplining rules of identity 
and responsibility that govern the community's supplemental texts: 
the Honor Code and the Racial Code. The murderer is Tom in terms 
of the legal text, and in terms of the liberal disciplining rule of 
identity that at least at times governs its interpretation: the person 
who committed the murder is physically continuous with the person 
known as Tom. But the murderer is not Tom in terms of the racial 
or noble meaning of identity and the disciplining rules that govern 
the interpretive practices by which such identity emerges. "Tom" 
was born a slave-and therefore, according to the Racial Code, is a 
slave, or more precisely, a nigger. "Tom" is Valet de Chambers 
masquerading as nobility. The apparent Tom lacks the family name 
that is definitive of the nobility, and possesses instead the racial 
blood that is sufficient for membership in the collectivity known as 
"slaves." 
To fully answer the question of who killed Judge Driscoll, then, 
Wilson must not only prove that the physically continuous person 
known as Tom killed Driscoll, in terms of the legal-liberal Code, but 
must also establish that that person is really Valet de Chambers, and 
not Tom at all, in terms of the racial and aristocratic Code. Inter-
preting physical, behavioral and historical facts in accord with the 
racial, liberal and noble meanings of identity and responsibility, 
Wilson achieves his climactic courtroom triumph: 
"We will turn to the infant autographs of A and B. I will ask 
the jury to take these large pantograph facsimilies of A's, marked 
five months and seven months. Do they tally?" 
The foreman responded-"Perfectly." 
"Now examine this pantograph, taken at eight months, and 
also marked A. Does it tally with the other two?" 
The surprised response was-
55. [d. at 106-109. 
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"No-they differ widely!" 
"Do you know how to account for those strange discrepancies? 
I will tell you. For a purpose unknown to us, but probably a selfish 
one, somebody changed those children in the cradle. 
"Between the ages of seven months and eight months those 
children were changed in the cradle ... and the person who did it 
is in this house!" 
"A was put into B's cradle in the nursery; B was transferred to 
the kitchen, and became a negro and a slave . . . but within a 
quarter of an hour he will stand before you white and free! ... 
From seven months onward until now, A has still been a usurper, 
and in my finger-records he bears B's name. Here is his pantograph, 
at the age of twelve. Compare it with the assassin's signature upon 
the knife handle. Do they tally?" 
The foreman answered-
"To the minutest detail!" 
Wilson said solemnly -
"The murderer of your friend and mine-York Driscoll, of the 
generous hand and the kindly spirit-sits among you. Valet de 
Chambre, negro and slave - falsely called Thomas it Becket Dris-
coll-make upon the window the finger-prints that will hang you!" 
Tom turned his ashen face imploringly toward the speaker, 
made some impotent movements with his white lips, then slid limp 
and lifeless to the floor. Wilson broke the awed silence with the 
words-
"There is no need. He has confessed. "56 
A. The Racial Code and the Code oj Honor: Disciplining Rules 
and Supplemental Texts 
The three supplemental Codes involved in Pudd'nhead Wilson-
the Liberal Code, the Code of Honor and the Racial Code-fulfill 
in virtually every respect the criteria Ronald Dworkin establishes for 
supplemental moral texts in Taking Rights Seriously. The disciplining 
rules similarly fulfill in every respect the criteria Owen Fiss establishes 
for disciplining rules in Objectivity and Interpretation. First, as 
Dworkin would insist, the supplemental Codes do indeed have legal 
force: they define the interpretive limits of the community's legal 
texts. The Code of Honor limits the "jurisdictional" reach of the 
law in a relatively overt manner: gentlemen are responsible for 
breaches of family honor, not individual breaches of law. In Dwor-
kin's world, the "principle of honor" that "no man can profit from 
56. [d. at 111-13. 
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his own wrong," for example, limits the positivistic impact of both 
wills and the law of testamentary disposition. Similarly, in Pudd'n-
head Wilson we learn that whatever the written law of homicide, the 
unwritten Code of Honor requires that an assault upon one's honor 
of a certain magnitude be met with death. We also learn that the 
Code of Honor demands that a gentleman defend an assault on one's 
brother, to the death if necessary. And, we learn that upon being 
assaulted, a gentleman responds on the field of honor, and not in a 
court of law. 
Furthermore, just as we learn of the rule that "no man can profit 
from his own wrong" from a court, we learn virtually all of the 
rules of the Code of Honor operative in Dawson's Landing from the 
town's legal community; either from the Judge, from Pembroke, or 
from Pudd'nhead himself. Each important member of the legal 
"interpretive community" makes explicit his complete endorsement 
and embrace of the disciplining rules of Honor. Indeed, Judge 
Driscoll is not just surprised to learn of his (purported) nephew's 
breach of the "jurisdictional rule" that a victim of an assault must 
respond on the field of honor, he is horrified: 
"You cur! You scum! you vermin! Do you mean to tell me 
that blood of my race has suffered a blow and crawled to a court 
of law about it? Answer me! 
"A coward in my family! A Driscoll a coward! Oh, what have 
I done to deserve this infamy!" He tottered to his secretary in the 
corner repeating that lament again and again in heart-breaking tones, 
and got out of a drawer a paper, which he slowly tore to bits .... 
"There it is, shreds and fragments once more-my will. Once 
more you have forced me to disinherit you, you base son of a most 
noble father! Leave my sight! Go-before I spit on yoU!"S7 
Pudd'nhead Wilson, retained as counsel for the defendants in the 
assault case, is equally offended by Tom's breach, and makes clear 
his understanding of the limit on the criminal law of assault and 
battery imposed by the Code of Honor: 
"Tom, I am ashamed of you! I don't see how you could treat 
your good old uncle so. I am a better friend of his than you are; 
for if I had known the circumstances I would have kept that case 
out of court until I got word to him and let him have a gentleman's 
chance. 
"You degenerate remnant of an honorable line! I'm thoroughly 
ashamed of you, Tom!"S8 
57. Id. at 60. 
58. Id. at 62-63. 
HeinOnline -- 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 232 1986-1987
232 TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 54 
Judge Driscoll and Pudd'nhead Wilson are not the only characters 
devastated by Tom's multiple breaches of the Code of Honor. Roxy 
(Tom's true biological mother) knows what the rest of the community 
does not know, and that is Tom's true paternity. For although Tom 
is not the nephew of Judge Driscoll, as he is pretending, he is indeed 
the biological son of another descendent of the First Families (in 
addition to being a slave, by virtue of his mother's identity). In 
Roxy's eyes, therefore, Tom is as committed to uphold the Code of 
Honor by virtue of his paternity as he is collectively guilty by virtue 
of his nigger blood. She too is horrified to hear of the breach: 
"What is you mumblin' 'bout Chambers?" 
"The old man tried to get me to fight one [(a duel)] with Count 
Luigi, but he didn't succeed; so I reckon he concluded to patch up 
the family honor himself." 
He laughed at the idea, and went rambling on with a detailed 
account of ... how shocked and ashamed the Judge was to find 
that he had a coward in his family. He glanced up at last, and got 
a shock himself. Roxana's bosom was heaving with suppressed 
passion, and she was glowering down upon him with measureless 
contempt written in her face. 
"En you refuse' to fight a man dat kicked you, 'stid 0' jumpin' 
at de chance! En you ain't got no mo' feelin' den to come en tell 
me, dat fetched sich a po' low-down ornery rabbit into de worI'! 
Pah! It make me sick!"59 
The Racial Code similarly limits the jurisdictional and remedial 
reach of the positive law. Niggers are guilty, but they are guilty not 
by virtue of individual responsibility for breaches of law; they are 
gUilty by virtue of collective identity, and the appropriate punishment 
for this collective guilt is slavery itself, not legally prescribed sanc-
tions. In the novel's final act of legal interpretation, the newly 
reconstituted "interpretive community" -the court, the governor, the 
community and the murder victim's creditors-reads the relevant 
"texts"-Tom's act, Tom's status, the law of property, and the law 
of murder-in accord with all of the appropriate disciplining rules. 
They pose, collectively, a very difficult interpretive problem. Tom 
committed a murder, for which the legal punishment is imprisonment, 
but "Tom" is a slave, for which th~ racial punishment is slavery. In 
the book's denouement, they arrive at this highly creative interpretive 
solution to their legal problem: 
The false heir made a full confession and was sentenced to 
imprisonment for life. But now a complication came up. The Percy 
Driscoll estate was in such a crippled shape when its owner died 
that it could pay only sixty percent of its great indebtedness, and 
was settled at that rate. But the creditors came forward, now, and 
59. Id. at 70. 
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complained that inasmuch as through an error for which they were 
in no way to blame the false heir was not inventoried at that time 
with the rest of the property, great wrong and loss had thereby 
been inflicted upon them. They rightly claimed that "Tom" was 
lawfully their property and had been so for eight years; . . . [and 
that but for the false inventory] they would have sold him and he 
could not have murdered Judge Driscoll, therefore it was not he 
that had really committed the murder, the guilt lay with the erro-
neous inventory. Everybody saw that there was reason in this. 
Everybody granted that if "Tom" were white and free it would be 
unquestionably right to punish him-it would be no loss to anybody; 
but to shut up a valuable slave for life-that was quite another 
matter. 
As soon as the Governor understood the case, he pardoned 
Tom at once, and the creditors sold him down the river. 60 
233 
As Fiss would insist they should, the disciplining rules do indeed 
discipline: there is only one school, and attendance is mandatory. 
The rules of discipline rule out certain interpretations, just as they 
validate and enable others. Indeed, for each "text" and textual 
interpretation facilitated by a disciplining rule, another text and 
another interpretation is ruled out. Twain gives three examples of 
this principle of exclusion, one for each of his central disciplining 
rules. First, we learn early on that Pudd'nhead Wilson has in fact 
taken up two hobbies during his extended period of relative under-
employment-fingerprinting and palmistry. But Pudd'nhead is clear, 
even if others are not, that it is fingerprinting, not the palm, which 
must constitute the "text" from which individual, continuous identity 
is read. The "disciplinary rule" of legalistic individualism is physical 
continuity with the person who committed the d~ed,· and only the 
fingerprint can give absolute testimony to that continuity across time. 
Nevertheless, to those members of the community who do not 
understand as fully as does Wilson himself the nature of legal 
liberalism and individualism, the allure of the palm as a text for 
individual responsibility is great: 
Wilson began to study Luigi's palm, tracing life lines, heart 
lines, head lines and so on, ... he felt of the fleshy cushion at the 
base of the thumb, and noted its shape; he felt of the fleshy side 
of the hand between the wrist and the base of the little finger, . . . 
He mapped out Luigi's character and disposition, his tastes, 
aversions, proclivities, ambitions and eccentricities .... 
Next, Wilson took up Luigi's history. He proceeded cautiously 
... moving his finger slowly along the great lines of the palm, and 
now and then halting it at a "star" or some such landmark and 
examining that neighborhood minutely. He proclaimed one or two 
past events, ... and the search went on. Presently Wilson glanced 
60. [d. at 114-15. 
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up suddenly with a surprised expression-
"Here is a record of an incident which you would perhaps not 
wish me to-" 
"Bring it out," said Luigi, good-naturedly, "I promise you it 
shan't embarrass me." 
"You have killed some one-but whether man, woman or child, 
I do not make out." 
"Caesar's ghost!" commented Tom, with astonishment. "It 
beats anything that was ever heard of! Why, a man's own hand is 
his deadliest enemy! Just think of that-a man's own hand keeps a 
record of the deepest and fatalest secrets of his life, and is treach-
erously ready to expose him to any black-magic stranger that comes 
along. "61 
Similarly, the "sham text" for racial identity is appearance: dress, 
skin color, and, in general, the perceptions of others. Although you 
might think you could infer racial identity by these factors, you 
cannot. The disciplining rule that governs interpretation of the Racial 
Code precludes such an interpretation, and precludes such a text; it 
is birth and bloodline, not behavior, that provides the link to 
collective gUilt that is race. Thus, when Roxy switches her baby for 
the child of her Master, she learns the proffered difference that 
clothes can make. But this text, like palmistry, is a sham and a trap. 
The interpretation of racial identity from clothes, bearing, perception 
of others and skin color is a compelling one, but it is not determi-
native, for it is precluded by the disciplining rule itself: 
. She undressed Thomas a Becket, stripping him of everything, and 
put the tow-linen shi:t on him. She put his coral necklace on her 
own child's neck. Then she placed the children side by side, and 
after earnest inspection she muttered-
"Now who would b'lieve clo'es could do de like 0' dat? Dog 
my cats if it ain't all I kin do to tell t'other fum which, let alone 
his pappy." 
She put her cub in Tommy's elegant cradle and said -
"You's young Marse Tom fum dis out, en 1 got to practice and 
git used to 'memberin' to call you dat, honey, or I's gwyne to make 
a mistake some time en git us bofe into trouble. Dah-now you lay 
still en don't fret no mo', Marse Tom-oh, thank de good Lord in 
heaven, you's saved! ... -dey ain't no man kin ever sell mammy's 
po' little honey down de river now!" 
She got up light-hearted and happy, and went to the cradles 
and spent what was left of the night "practicing." She would give 
her own child a light pat and say, humbly, "Lay still, Marse Tom," 
then give the real Tom a pat and say with severity, "Lay still, 
61. Id. at 51 (emphasis added). 
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Chambers! 
As she progressed with her practice, she was surprised to see 
how steadily and surely the awe which had kept her tongue reverent 
and her manner humble toward her young master was transferring 
itself to her speech and manner toward the usurper, and how 
similarly handy she was becoming in transferring her motherly 
curtness of speech and peremptoriness of manner to the unlucky 
heir of the ancient house of Driscoll. 62 
235 
And third, the sham text for nobility is upbringing, and the habits 
of self-regard they instill. Again, this text is compelling but the 
interpretations it suggests are bound to be misleading. The disciplining 
rule itself precludes it: 
[After Tom learned his true identity], . . . [f]or days he wandered 
in lonely places thinking, thinking, thinking - trying to get his 
bearings. It was new work. If he met a friend he found that the 
habit of a lifetime had in some mysterious way vanished-his arm 
hung limp instead of involuntarily extending the hand for a shake. 
It was the "nigger" in him asserting its humility, and he blushed 
and was abashed. And the "nigger" in him was surprised when the 
white friend put out his hand for a shake with him. He found the 
"nigger" in him involuntarily giving the road, on the sidewalk, to 
the white rowdy and loafer . . . . So strange and uncharacteristic 
was Tom's conduct that people noticed it and turned to look after 
him when he passed on; ... it gave him a sick feeling, and he took 
himself out of view as quickly as he could. 
In several ways his opinions were totally changed, and would 
never go back to what they were before, but the main structure of 
his character was not changed, and could not be changed . 
. . . Under the influence of a great mental and moral upheaval his 
character and habits had taken on the appearance of complete 
change, but after a while with the subsidence of the storm both 
began to settle toward their former places. He dropped gradually 
back into his old frivolous and easy-going ways, and conditions of 
feeling, and manner of speech, and no familiar of his could have 
detected anything in him that differentiated him from the weak and 
careless Tom of other days.63 
And, as Fiss also would insist, the disciplinary rules that govern 
these texts are the definitive parameters of the "interpretive com-
munity" -again, there is only one school, and attendance is indeed 
mandatory. To be a member of the community of Dawson's Landing 
is to accept and live by the Honor and Racial codes-those codes 
define the members, as much as the members define the codes. This 
mandatory attendance policy has two consequences. First, while there 
62. Id. at 14-16. 
63. Id. at 44-45. 
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are other non-mandatory "codes" subscribed to by parts of this 
community, they play no role in the community's core interpretive 
practices, and therefore play no role in the interpretation of law. 
Religion, for example, constitutes a non-mandatory moral code sub-
scribed to in some form by most members of the community, but 
not by its "first citizen" the judge-head of the town's agnostic 
"freethinkers" society. Similarly, the ethic endorsed by the villainous 
Tom-a lawless, gambling-prone and profit-motivated greed-may 
be the wave of the future (as Twain foresees) but it is not sanctioned 
by this conservative community, complete with its debauched demo-
cratic politics and its aristocratic bias. Twain makes his own contempt 
for it equally clear. 
Second, the mandatory attendance policy entails that the members 
of this interpretive community-lawyers and judges-are incapable 
of transcending the disciplining rules tliat govern them; to do so 
would constitute expUlsion from the interpretive community that is 
law. Not once does it occur to the town's "freethinkers"-Pudd'n-
head and Judge Driscoll-to question either the racial code or the 
Code of Honor (or the sanctity of property, another major theme of 
the novel). Indeed these freethinkers have more thoroughly and 
expertly absorbed these codes than has the rest of the community. 
They each earn the community's highest accolades of respect through 
their masterful interpretations of the community'S definitive texts. It 
is the disciplinary rules that define the boundaries of acceptable 
interpretation, and it is indeed submission to the disciplinary rules 
that defines membership in the interpretive community responsible 
for the town's legal order. 
B. Disciplining Rules, Objectivity and Hidden Imperatives 
The objectivity that legal interpretation achieves through reliance 
on disciplining rules comes with a high cost: it masks the imperative 
nature of the text being interpreted, and consequently the criteria 
against which the text and the rules that facilitate interpretation 
should be judged. Thus, the declaratory grammatical form of the 
"disciplining rule" that "niggers are guilty," like the "racial code" 
whose interpretation it facilitates, masks its imperative origin, and 
hence masks the criteria against which it should be judged. That 
"niggers are guilty" in Dawson's Landing is a true proposition, as 
are the related propositions that "Tom is a slave" and that "Roxy 
is black" and that both, therefore, can be (and are) sold down the 
river. But all of these true propositions are true by virtue of white 
fiat, not natural fact. They are true by virtue of an act of power, 
not an act of reasoned observation. It is not natural fact, but white 
dominance over slaves, which is reflected in the rule's proclamation 
of meaning-to be a "nigger" means to be guilty. It is most assuredly 
not skin color (for Roxy's skin is white), but white fiat, reflected in 
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the claim that "Roxy is black." And finally, it is not his individual 
guilt for his individual act of murder, but rather the white collective 
power over his collective race, that is reflected in the court's conclu-
sion that Tom is guilty, for which his punishment is to be sold down 
the river. 
The cost of objective interpretivism is just this: When we accept 
a state of the world that derives from an act of power as a part of 
the natural world, we lose sense of how to evaluate that state of the 
world; it becomes "arbitrary" in a perfectly benign sense. Twain 
gives us a metaphor. In an early passage, Roxy notes the arbitrary 
power of God to damn and save at whim. So long as the power is 
unquestioned, the result is viewed as natural. If guilt is a matter of 
celestial fiat, the "arbitrariness" of the outcome is no more something 
to be challenged or questioned than the natural fact that grass is 
green and the sky blue: 
[A]in't nobody kin save his own self - can't do it by faith, can't 
do it by works, can't do it no way at all. Free grace is de on'y 
way, en dat don't come fum nobody but jis' de Lord; en He kin 
give it to anybody He please, saint or sinner-He don't k'yer. He 
do jis as He's a mineter. He s'lect out anybody dat suit Him, en 
put another one in his place, en make de fust one happy forever en 
leave t'other one to burn wid Satan.64 
If it is part of God's nature that salvation and damnation are at 
whim, and if God is omnipotent, then it makes as little sense to 
question the "arbitrariness" of his judgment as to object to the sun's 
daily rising. Similarly, if it is part of being white to have unchecked 
power over blacks, and if black collective guilt simply is the white 
judgment, then it will not occur- to any member of the interpretive 
community to question the "arbitrariness" of this judgment. Thus, 
the question "what did the nigger do that accounts for his gUilt" is 
not just unanswerable; more importantly, it is unaskable. Like the 
question "what did the sinner do to deserve salvation," the question 
is precluded by the disciplining rules that enable the discourse. Black 
guilt is a function of collective identity, not individual deed; the 
question "what did he do" is ruled out. It is therefore not surprising 
that the only character in the novel who ever broaches the question 
is Tom, and he raises it only once, right after he has learned he is a 
"nigger." When Tom learns his true identity, after twenty-five years 
of believing himself white, he is suddenly cast out of the interpretive 
community-he is neither white nor black. Because of his exclusion, 
and only because of his exclusion, he can ask the very question that 
the members of the community cannot themselves possibly utter: 
"Why were niggers and whites made? What crime did the 
uncreated first nigger commit that the curse of birth was decreed 
64. [d. at 15. 
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for him? And why is this awful difference made between white and 
black? ... How hard the nigger's fate seems, this morning!-yet 
until last night such a thought never entered my head. "65 
In this case, of course, objective interpretation and submission to 
the disciplining rules which facilitates it, has not only masked the 
imperative nature of the primary rule of the racial text-that niggers 
are gUilty-it has also masked the imperative nature of the rule's 
constitutive parts. For to take Tom's questions in order: Niggers and 
whites were not made by God-the division of the species into niggers 
and whites is not a part of the natural order. There are no natural 
niggers; there is no such natural attribute. The niggers in Pudd'nhead 
Wilson· underscore this truth. Both Roxy and Tom share the skin 
coloring of whites. Roxy is one-sixteenth black, Tom is one thirty.:. 
second. The categories "nigger" and "white" were indeed made, but 
they were made by whites, not by God, as Tom's question falsely 
implies. When the imperative is exposed, and only when the imper-
ative is exposed, does the "why" become askable and answerable: 
niggers were made by whites to serve the interest of whites. 
Thus, the reader of the novel, free of the disciplining rules that 
govern and define the interpretive community of Dawson's Landing, 
unlike the interpretive community itself, can assess the merits of this 
imperative. In a parallel fashion, I believe, the careful reader of this 
novel, unlike the interpretive community itself, can correctly "inter-
pret" Pudd'nhead Wilson's ill-fated joke, for it is squarely in this 
macabre joke, I believe, that the central message of this peculiar 
novel is to be found. As mentioned above, at the outset of the novel 
Wilson hears an invisible dog barking, and jokes that he wished he 
owned half of it, for if he did, he would kill his half. The joke never 
receives an adequate interpretation through the entire novel-in fact 
it may be the only thoroughly misinterpreted text in the book. This 
suggests, I submit, that the joke is in there for the reader, not the 
characters, to interpret. 
What does the joke mean? First, as several commentators have 
noted, "dog" is a central metaphor in this book for "nigger." 
Sometimes "dog" metaphorically connotes "villian" and sometimes 
"victim," but it is always a symbol for "niggers." Niggers generally 
and Tom in particular are referred to as "dogs" no less than half a 
dozen times. The most telling reference of the first type (dog as 
metaphor for guilty villain) is made by Pudd'nhead Wilson himself 
when he finally solves the murder mystery (but before he discovers 
the switch in identity). Tom is visiting Wilson the night before the 
twins' trial is to commence, and inadvertently leaves a fingerprint on 
one of Wilson's glass plates: 
65. Id. at 44. 
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[Tom] took up another strip of glass, and exdaimed-"Why, here's 
old Roxy's label! Are you going to ornament the royal palaces with 
nigger paw-marks, too? By the date here, I was seven months old 
when this was done and she was nursing me and her little nigger 
cub. There's a line straight across her thumb-print. How comes 
that?" ... 
"That is common," said the bored man, wearily. "Scar of a 
cut or a scratch, usually" -and he took the strip of glass indiffer-
ently and raised it toward the lamp. 
[As Wilson recognized Tom's fingerprints as the same as those 
on the murder weapon] [a]ll the blood sunk suddenly out of his 
face; his hand quaked, and he gazed at the polished surface before 
him with the glassy stare of a corpse . . . . 
[A]s Tom went out he couldn't deny himself a small parting 
gibe: "Don't take it so hard; a body can't win every time; you'll 
hang somebody yet." 
Wilson muttered to himself, "It is no lie to say I am sorry I 
have to begin with you, miserable dog though you are!"66 
239 
The most telling reference of the second sort-dog as a metaphor 
for victim-is made by Roxy, upon learning that Tom has committed 
the ultimate betrayal, and sold her down the river in order to reap 
the cash: "Sell a pusson down de river-down de river! ... I 
wouldn't treat a dog SO!"67 Roxy immediately follows this exclama-
tion with a comparison of Tom with a dog-as-scoundrel: 
"What could you do? You could be Judas to yo' own mother to 
save yo' wuthless hide! Would anybody b'lieve it? No - a dog 
couldn't! You is de low-downest orneriest hound dat was ever pup'd 
into dis worl'-en I's 'sponsible for it!" - and she spat on him.68 
How, even with this information, should we interpret Pudd'nhead's 
joke? The reader can interpret the joke in light of the disciplining 
rules by which the community lives but fails to question: first that a 
"dog" is a metaphor for "slave," and second that a dog, like a 
slave, is both property and villain, both owned and guilty. Now in a 
fairly literal sense, both the novel in general and the joke in particular 
are about the problem white slave-owning communities faced regard-
ing mulattoes. As mentioned above, both of the central "nigger" 
characters in this novel are of mixed blood: Roxy is one sixteenth 
black, and Tom is one thirty-second. Further, both characters have 
the blood of nobility as well as the blood of the negro race. One 
interpretation of the joke then is simply this: Enslavement of the 
negro race is tantamount to ownership of half a dog-it is just as 
cruel and just as foolish. You cannot enslave the "nigger" half of 
66. [d. at 103. 
67. [d. at 85. 
68. [d. at 90. 
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Tom and expect the "noble half" to be honorable; you cannot 
vIctimize the slave half and expect the noble half to be strong; you 
cannot damn the slave half and expect the noble half to be virtuous; 
you most assuredly cannot own the slave half and expect the noble 
half to breathe free. To try to do so-to own the slave, and sell him 
as property, and condemn him to hell by selling him down the river-
is to kill him; and as the neighbors rightly insist, you cannot kill half 
a living creature and expect the other half to live. What they do not 
see, of course, is that this is as true of human beings as it is of dogs. 
Nor do they see, therefore, the necessary implication of their own 
literalistic interpretation of Pudd'nhead's joke: the man that owns 
and kills half the dog will be equally responsible for the death of the 
other half. The race that owns, enslaves, kills and damns half a 
human being as "slave," will kill the other half as well, and some 
day be held responsible for doing So. 
If we turn our backs on the disciplining rule of Dawson's Land-
ing, and embrace instead one closer to our own frame of reference, 
we can generate a related and more powerful interpretation of 
Wilson's joke. A dog is a living organism, and in a different sense 
so is a community. We might, then, regard the dog in the joke as a 
metaphoric reference to the community itself. Owning and killing 
half a dog, with this disciplining rule of interpretation, is a metaphor 
for the imperative institution of slavery itself: the owning and killing 
of a half of the community, with the same consequences. You cannot 
enslave and kill half the community without killing the whole, any 
more than you can kill half a dog and keep the whole alive. If you 
try, you may, one day, be held responsible for the death of the 
whole, where the whole is a community no less than where the whole 
is a dog. 
C. The Morality oj the Objective Interpretivist 
The most difficult and ambiguous aspect of Twain's novel con-
cerns the character of Pudd'nhead himself. No issue more divides 
the criticism and interpretations of this novel than whether or not 
Pudd'nhead, surely the protagonist, is also a hero. The case for his 
heroism (endorsed by nineteenth-century critics far more consistantly 
than twentieth) is straightforward: Pudd'nhead is smart, even a 
genius. He is inventive, clever, and legalistic; he is a Dworkinian 
Hercules. He understands the community and the community's foibles 
better than do its members. He is shunned for twenty years, but 
perseveres, and finally comes into his own. He goes from town fool 
to town mayor, and he does so through .the honorable means of 
success in the law. He is neither materialistic nor greedy. He is funny. 
He rises in popUlarity as he brings Tom, the villian, down. He brings 
both law and science to a relatively lawless and superstitious com-
munity. He is respectful of the community he seeks to reform. He 
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knows human nature, he is insightful, and finally, of course, he is 
successful. 
All this, though, leaves a bitter taste, and I suspect that the 
further we move in history from the date of the novel, the stranger 
the taste becomes. There is something deeply wrong with this fairly 
standard interpretation of the heroic Pudd'nhead. First, and most 
simply, there is something wrong with the idea that Mark Twain-
who gave us Huckleberry Finn, Jim, the Mississippi River, and the 
journey up the Mississippi River as a powerful symbol of freedom 
and salvation-would create a hero who sends a slave down 'the river 
into slavery and damnation, no matter how evil the slave. Second, 
there is something wrong with the idea that Mark Twain would give 
us a novel hera/ding the racist and aristocratic values of a small 
slave-holding town, and trumpeting as a hero an outsider who 
becomes an insider by embracing those values. Furthermore, Twain 
himself referred to Wilson's role in the novel as a mere "machine."69 
(Surely, author's intent should count for something.) But considerably 
more than author's intent must be put aside to accommodate a 
reading of Wilson as a lawyer-hero. There is no doubt that Wilson 
is clever, and there is no doubt that he achieves what he's craved: 
popularity and success in the community. Wilson's virtue, however, 
depends upon the virtue of the community that has embraced him, 
and on the virtue of this community, not just Twain, but the novel 
itself, is anything but ambiguous. The community is evil, plain and 
simple. The irony of this novel, finally, is that while as reader we 
condemn the community's values, we want to applaud the protagonist 
who has won that community's approval, even when he achieves it 
by advocating the values we wish to condemn. 
One plausible interpretation of the meaning of Twain's novel, I 
believe, is that we should learn to be skeptical (if we aren't naturally 
so) of the interpretivist means by which Wilson wins his way into 
the community's embrace-and into the hearts of many readers as 
well. How we evaluate Wilson's character depends upon how we 
regard his interpretive legal practices, and thus how we regard the 
nature of law itself. If we regard law, properly supplemented by 
community values, as a set of texts to be interpreted, we will also 
tend to regard Wilson as a hero. If we regard law as a set of 
imperative commands, we will tend to regard Wilson as complicit, to 
some degree commensurate with his power, in the town's evil. The 
"objectivity" of the supplemental, disciplined interpretation in which 
Wilson engages, I submit, masks the moral character of this most 
69. This remark is attributed to Twain by Marvin Fisher and Michael Elliott 
in their interpretive essay, Pudd'nHead Wilson: Half a Dog is Worse than None, in 
S. CLEMENS, PUOD'NHEAD WILSON AND THOSE EXTRAORDINARY TWINS 309 (1980). 
The reference is to M. TWAIN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A WRITER 181 (1962). 
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masterful interpreter, as well as the criteria by which we should 
evaluate his acts. 
For it is undoubtedly true that from a Dworkinian and Fissian 
perspective, Pudd'nhead is a hero-he achieves the kind of success 
for which Hercules is the ideal. The story of Pudd'nhead's success is 
the story of Hercules' success: it is a story of the triumph of legalism. 
Disputes are resolved in court, advocated by lawyers, decided by 
neutral judges, according to agreed upon rules. And furthermore, 
the triumph of law in the community is not a victory of an invading, 
foreign or hostile force. Wilson achieves his triumph by incorporating 
the town's moral values into the legal values he brings with him from 
back East, not by displacing those values. As Fiss would concede 
must be the case, and as Dworkin insists should be the case, Wilson 
learns to read the law through the prism of the town's values. 
Through that process the town's morality becomes infused in the 
town's law, and the distinction between moral and legal rules dis-
solves. The town's legal order becomes circumscribed by the town's 
moral order-they each define as they facilitate the other. It is by 
mastering that process that Wilson (like Hercules) achieves success. 
More specifically, from what Fiss calls an internal perspective,70 
Pudd'nhead emerges from Tom's trial a community hero, a widely 
acclaimed interpretive Hercules. He reads the objective legal text 
through the "prism" of the town's moral values, and he interprets 
the resulting supplemented text in accordance with the disciplining 
rules that govern the town's interpretive practices. He performs as 
both a "servant of the law and a servant of the community." He 
holds the community's values-not his own-paramount in his legal 
analysis. By interpreting the town's multiple codes, by respecting 
their interpretive practices, by integrating their moral values with 
their le~l text, he achieves the popularity he had so long craved-
he becomes successor to the title "first citizen" previously held by 
the murdered judge. And, even from what Fiss calls the outsider's 
external perspective,71 Pudd'nhead is absolved from responsibility. 
The same "objectivity" that constitutes his internal heroism shields 
him from external responsibility. Pudd'nhead himself is not respon-
sible for the town's morality-Pudd'nhead is an Eastern-trained 
outsider. And, it is the town's morality-not the lawyer's-which 
must supplement the text of the positive law, and discipline its 
interpretation. Consequently Pudd'nhead, no less than Hercules, 
cannot be held responsible for the results the legal system, supple-
mented as it must be by the town's morality, generates. More 
graphically, Pudd'nhead himself does not sell Tom down the river. 
Pudd'nhead simply supplies the most coherent, most correct, and 
70. Fiss, supra note 16, at 748. 
71. [d. 
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most powerful interpretation of the community's texts. It was those 
texts that sold Tom down the river. The law did it, not the lawyer. 
However, if we regard law, including the values that supplement 
it, and the disciplining 'rules that govern it, as a set of impe,ratives 
rather than objective texts, Pudd'nhead's character takes on a differ-
ent hue. Wilson is a political actor in a political community, and like 
all the actors in that community he has some power. Not much, but 
some. With power comes responsibility-not much, perhaps, but 
some. If we regard law as an imperative, Wilson's incorporation of 
the community's racial code into the law is an act of power and a 
choice, not an act of passive interpretation. As such it renders him 
complicit in the town's corruption; it does not ennoble him. And in 
fact, Wilson is complicit in the town's evil: Wilson does sell Tom 
down the river. For it is not by virtue of the "liberal legalism" to 
which Wilson is purportedly committed that Wilson feels he must 
expose Tom as a slave in court. All Wilson has to do to show who 
killed the victim is prove that the fingerprints on the knife are Tom's. 
Although it has escaped notice of most commentators on this novel, 
there is no reason either in law or in liberal logic that this "heroic" 
lawyer-protagonist has to go the extra step and expose Tom as a 
slave. He chooses to. And it is because he chooses to that Tom is 
delivered downstream. 
Wilson exposes Tom as a slave as well as a murderer not because 
the legal code demands it, but because the community's racial code 
demands it, and Wilson has learned that to be successful-to be 
popular-in this town, he must interpret the law through the prism 
of the rules of race. This act of interpretation, however, was neither 
natural nor necessary: Wilson chose to interpret the law in light of 
the racial code; he did not have to do so. He could have done 
otherwise. He could have forfeited popularity, and used his small 
amount of power instead to challenge the racial code. He could have 
challenged the social construction by which black is delineated from 
white. But he did not. Instead he embraced, endorsed, absorbed, 
incorporated and then used the community's racial code. He mastered 
it, and became the town's first citizen by virtue of that mastery. By 
doing so, he became an authority on its meaning and responsible for 
its content. By endorsing the community's code, Wilson perpetuated 
it; by incorporating the racial code into the legal code he authored 
it. He read the objective law through the prism of the community's 
moralistic embrace of evil, and by doing so he embraced that evil as 
his own. Wilson got the wish he initially expressed as a joke: he 
owned and then killed half the dog-he exposed Tom as a slave and 
sent him down the river. And he should be held responsible for 
having done so. 
Why did he do it? This is not a hard question. Wilson craved 
what Hercules has: popularity and respect. For twenty years, he 
craved the town's respect, and through his interpretive prowess he 
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eventually got it. He achieved the popularity he needed through an 
act of paradigmatic conformity: objective, disciplined interpretation 
of the community's supplemented legal texts. What Wilson doesn't 
gain is a more just community, and what Tom doesn't gain, of 
course, is justice. Pudd'nhead Wilson is no hero, nor is Dworkin's 
Hercules, and neither are the judges, lawyers, and legal footsoldiers 
that emulate his aspirations. Pudd'nhead, like Hercules, is the ulti-
mate conformist, and conformity for the sake of popularity is no 
virtue. 
Of course, conformity for the sake of popularity, success, or for 
that matter survival is no sin, either, at least during the normal run 
of things. It is natural for us to interpret our community's mores 
just to survive in our community; perhaps it is even inevitable. And, 
it is natural for those of us who are political actors to become expert 
interpreters, and to turn that skill into political gain. But we should 
not confuse what is natural, and excusable, and understandable, with 
what is virtue, any more than we should confuse the absence of 
villainy with heroism. Pudd'nhead may be a popular mayor and 
Hercules may be a popular judge. Both political triumphs are achieved 
through interpretive prowess rather than the ballot box. But they are 
just that: political victories. Whether or not they are moral victories 
as well is a separate question entirely. 
IV. SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETIVISM 
Subjective interpretivism, as the name I have given it implies, 
shares one commitment with objective interpretivism: like their ob-
jective counterparts, subjective interpretivists view adjudication as an 
interpretive act. Thus for subjectivists such as Stanley Fish, no less 
than for objectivists such as Dworkin and Fiss, adjudication is 
primarily an act of interpretation. Subjective interpretivists differ 
from objectivists over the nature of interpretation, and as a result 
over the consequences of adjudication's interpretive core. Subjectiv-
ists insist that the malleability of text-its lack of an "objective 
meaning" -renders interpretation itself inevitably "subjective." 
Therefore, the "interpretation" of a text is really an act of power 
rather than an act of understanding. The interpreter chooses the 
meaning; he does not deduce it. For the subjectivist, the fact that 
adjudication is interpretation, far from being what constrains the 
judge, is what empowers the judge. The fact that adjudication is 
interpretation, then, creates rather than cures the problem of power. 
The interpretive core of adjudication is precisely what renders adju-
dication an act of power. Interpretation is imperative. Adjudication 
is interpretive. Therefore, adjudication is imperative. 
As a consequence of their view of the nature of interpretation, 
subjective interpretivists also share a commitment with the imperativ-
ist tradition. Like the imperativists, they hold that adjudication is an 
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act of power, and not an act of discovery. Their argument, however, 
for the claim that adjudication is an act of power is different from 
that put forward by the imperativists. For the imperativists, including 
both the British legal positivists and the American legal realists, that 
adjudication is power follows from the force distinctively wielded by 
the judiciary: adjudication is an act of power because it is backed by 
the command of the state. For subjective interpretivists, by contrast, 
that adjudication is imperative follows not from the force commanded 
by the judiciary, but instead from its interpretive core. Adjudication 
is an act of power because it is interpretive, and interpretation is 
itself; inevitably, an act of power. For the subjective interpretivist, it 
is the interpretive core of adjudication that entails its imperative 
nature, not the force it wields. 
Subjective interpretivism is typically criticized today (almost al-
ways by objective interpretivists) on the grounds that its claim that 
interpretation is necessarily subjective (and hence that objective inter-
pretation is impossible) is wrong. What is at stake in this debate 
between objective and subjective interpretivists is the possibility of 
objectivity in interpretive adjudication. If the objectivists are right 
about the nature of interpretation, and if adjudication is primarily 
an interpretive act, then adjudication is an act of discovery rather 
than an act of power. If the subjectivists are right about the nature 
of interpretation and if adjudication is an interpretive act, then 
adjudication is an act of power rather than an act of discovery. If 
adjudication is indeed interpretation, the debate between objective 
and subjective views of the interpretive enterprise is surely an impor-
tant one. It is not, however, the question I will pursue here. 
What. I will argue here is that subjectivists are wrong about the 
nature of interpretation, and more specifically, that they are wrong 
in their claim that so many of the things we do with words-including 
both adjudication and criticism of adjudication-constitutes interpre-
tation. In one respect, their incredibly inclusive view of the scope of 
our interpretive practices is false, but harmlessly so. Adjudication is 
not primarily interpretation, it is primarily imperative and secondarily 
interpretation. This mistaken emphasis, however, is relatively harm-
less. We can reap the benefits of subjectivist analysis of the interpre-
tive aspect of adjudication without having to accept (or reject) their 
underlying claim that adjudication is primarily interpretation. But in 
another respect the wide net subjectivists have cast in the name of 
"interpretation" is dangerously overbroad: it is dangerously over-
broad because Of its implication that criticism of law, no less than 
adjudication itself, is an "interpretive act." I will argue that the view 
of criticism that emerges from the subjectivist's view of interpretation 
is not just mistaken, but dangerously so. Contrary to the claim of at 
least some of its adherents, the view of criticism that follows from 
subjectivist premises is deeply reactionary, not progressive, in its 
political implications. 
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A. Subjective Interpretivism and Imperativism 
Subjective interpretivism (hereinafter "subjectivism") and imper-
ativism are often confused for good reason: they share a vision of 
law and adjudication that is more similar than dissimilar. Both 
traditions view adjudication as imperative, and both traditions differ 
from objectivism on precisely that point. The proposition "this 
contract is unconscionable," for example, would be regarded by the 
objective interpretivist as a statement of legal fact, or a part of legal 
knowledge. It is either right or wrong; it is either true or false. For 
both the subjectivist and the imperativist, the same proposition is 
declaratory in grammatical form only, and that grammatical form is 
misleading. In fact, when uttered by a judge, the proposition states 
(or masks) an imperative: this court will refuse to enforce this 
contract. This shared commitment to the underlying imperative core 
of adjudication is an important one. It is this shared belief that 
constitutes the premise, for both traditions, of their central work: 
the discovery (or the unmasking, or the deconstruction) of the 
imperative lurking behind all purportedly propositional statements of 
legal truth. 
However, imperativism and subjectivism reach this shared com-
mitment by wildly divergent analyses of the nature of interpretation, 
which in turn entail wildly divergent views of the nature of legal 
criticism. For the imperativist the proposition "this contract is un-
conscionable," uttered by a court, is a masked imperative-it is 
declaratory in form only. It expresses a command of the court, not 
a truth about an existing "contract." Its "truth" or "falsity," then, 
depends upon the power of the court, not upon the content of some 
pre-existing legal rule or the nature of the "contract." But the 
imperative nature of legal truths is solely a function of judicial 
power; it does not imply the imperative nature of all truths. By 
contrast, the critical claim, for example, that "unconscionable con-
tracts frustrate real human needs" is a claim about our real human 
needs, not a hidden imperative. The critical claim is just what it 
appears to be: a propositional claim about the relation between a 
political practice and a human need. Whether or not it is true or 
false depends upon whether or not it is true or false that unconscion-
able contracts frustrate real human needs. Its truth or falsity depends 
on the nature of our real human needs, not on the power or lack of 
power of the critic. 
Subjective interpretivists, distinctively, deny this. For the subjec-
tivist, both legal adjudication and legal criticism are "interpretive" 
acts, and all interpretive acts are imperative in the same way that 
adjudication is imperative. An interpretive act is a (necessarily sub-
jective) interpretation of a "text" that is itself "socially constructed." 
Thus, the "legal text" that constitutes the major premise for the 
court's conclusion that "this contract is unenforceable" is not a "real 
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contract" or a "real precedent" or a "real legal doctrine" existing 
in a land of discoverable legal reality, but rather is a social construc-
tion generated by political processes. Similarly, the subjectivist holds, 
the "social text" for the critical (rather than adjudicatory) claim that 
"enforcing unconscionable contracts frustrates real human needs" is 
not "our real human needs." Human beings do not have "real 
human needs" any more than the legal world has "real contracts" 
or "real rules of law." The critical claim that we have a "real 
need"-and that a law frustrates it-is but an interpretation, neces-
sarily subjective, of a socially constructed "text" generated by polit-
ical processes. The criticism of law, then, because it is no less 
interpretive, is therefore no less imperative than the adjudication of 
law. The critical claim that "enforcing unconscionable contracts 
frustrates real human needs," like the adjudicative claim that "this 
contract is unconscionable," is not something which is either "true" 
or "false." Like all acts of interpretation, it is a masked assertion 
of power. It is a chosen "interpretation" of a social "text" that we 
have created, not a proposition (either true or false) about our human 
needs. All we can say about the claim that "unconscionable contracts 
frustrate real human needs" is whether or not the claim has attained 
political success: if it is something a great number of people have 
come to live by, it is successful; if not, it is unsuccessful. We cannot 
determine whether it is "true" or not for the simple reason that there 
are no "real human needs" against which it can be judged, any more 
than there are contracts pre-labeled "unc<?nscionable" or "enforce-
able." All there is, is the speaker's desire to see certain contracts 
struck, the speaker's desire to couch that commitment in the language 
of real human needs, and the speaker's relative power (of persuasion 
or force) in imposing that preference on others. We should not be 
fooled by this mystifying claim that there are "real needs" any more 
than we should allow ourselves to be fooled by the obfuscating 
declaratory rhetoric of courts regarding the "real" existence of 
contracts. 
The central and distinguishing commitment of subjective interpre-
tivism, unshared by imperativism, then, is this: there is no "real" 
basis for moral criticism of law any more than there is a "real" 
basis for adjudication. There are no "real human needs" (or "real" 
anything else-real rights, real justice, real human potential) by which 
to criticize law any more than there are "real contracts" or "real" 
neutral principles by which to adjudicate. That there are "real needs" 
is an illusion in precisely the way (and for precisely the reason) that 
it is an illusion that there are "real contracts." Both illusions manifest 
as well as result from the power of some political actor. There are 
no real needs because there is no ahistorical, non-contingent "human 
nature." There are only conflicting critical "subjective interpreta-
tions" of our contingent social and political history, including the 
history of our various political imaginings. The human nature we 
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think we see, with its attendant human needs, and perhaps human 
rights, is but a product of some strand of our contingent social 
history, which could well have been otherwise. There are no real 
needs, rights or justice that transcend our history, or our conventions. 
There is only political will: felt, perceived, and interpreted in a 
thousand different ways. 
This rift between imperativists (whether they regard themselves as 
legal realists or legal positivists or critical legal scholars) and subjec-
tive interpretivists (whether or not they regard themselves as "decon-
structionists"), typically obscured by their considerable common 
ground, has recently come to the surface. In a revealing article 
entitled Anti-Projessionalism,72 Stanley Fish, our foremost subjective 
interpretivist, attacks a range of theorists he calls, generically, "anti-
professionalists," including two prominent legal critics-Bob Gordon 
and Duncan Kennedy. Fish takes the anti-professionalists to task for 
their insistence on the existence of "real" needs and "real" ideals 
and a "real" human potential, as a basis for criticism of politics, 
professions, laws, and institutional histories. The article is the clearest 
exposition to date of the nature of the divide between subjectivists 
on the one hand, and imperativists on the other. 
Fish begins his attack on Gordon by laying stake to their common 
ground. Gordon and Fish agree on the nature of law. They agree 
that purportedly neutral law is in fact political: 
Gordon [has discovered] ... that legal reasoning is not "a set of 
neutral techniques available to everyone" but is everywhere in-
formed by policy, and that judicial decisionmaking, despite claims 
to objectivity and neutrality, rests on "[s]ocial and political judg-
ments about the substance, parties, and context of a case ... even 
when they are not the explicit or conscious basis of decision." [He] 
has discovered, in short, that rather than being grounded in natural 
and logical necessity, the legal process always reflects the interests 
and concerns of some political or economic agenda, and [he] moves 
on to unfreeze the world as it appears to common sense as a bunch 
of more or less objectively determined social relations and to make 
it appear as (we believe) it really is: people acting, imagining, 
rationalizing, justifying. "73 
With Gordon's legal imperativism, Fish is in agreement. But, Fish 
complains, Gordon next implies that we should criticize these "act-
ings, imaginings, rationalizings and justifyings" of the legal culture 
by reference to our "real" nature. This, Fish insists, we cannot do. 
There is no more of a "real" human nature than there are "real" 
contracts (or neutral principles). From Fish's point of view, Gordon's 
insistence on the viability of such criticism is not only ill-founded, 
72. Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 645 (1986). 
73. Id. at 656. 
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but illogical. It is illogical, Fish argues, because it is inconsistent with 
Gordon's insistence on the political underpinnings of purportedly 
neutral law: 
The full force of this contradiction becomes clear ... when Gordon 
declares that the "discovery" that the "belief structures that rule 
our lives are not found in nature but are historically contingent" is 
"liberating"; but of course the discovery can only be liberating (in 
a strong sense) if by some act of magic· the insight that one is 
historically conditioned is itself not historically achieved and enna-
bles one ... to operate outside of history. Gordon's capitulation 
to the essentialist ideology he opposes is complete when he fully 
specifies what he means by liberating: "This discovery is ... 
liberating ... because uncovering those [belief] structures makes us 
see how arbitrary our categories for dividing up experience are." 
... What Gordon wants (although by his own principles he should 
want no such thing) are categories uninvolved in interest; and it is 
in the context of that absolutist and essentialist desire, that the ways 
and categories we have can be termed arbitrary. 74 
Fish next criticises Duncan Kennedy for the same sin. Having 
exposed the imperative and political underpinning of the declaratory 
form of legal ideology, doctrine and culture, Fish argues, Kennedy 
cannot then assert the existence of a "real" natural basis for nor-
mative criticism of those unmasked imperatives: 
Exactly the same line of reasoning is displayed by Gordon's col-
league Duncan Kennedy when he moves from the observation that 
legal reasoning is everywhere informed by policy to the conclusion 
that those who teach legal reasoning teach "nonsense," only argu-
mentative techniques, "policy and nothing more." But arguments 
based on policy can be devalued and declared nonsensical only if 
one assumes the existence and availability of arguments . . . based 
on a sense beyond policy, a sense which, because it is apolitical or 
extrapolitical, can serve as a reference point from which the merely 
political can be identified and judged .... He buys into that vision 
again when he declares that "the classroom distinction between the 
unproblematic, legal case and the policy-oriented case is a mere 
artifact." [Artifact] is a "hinge" word, poised between the insight 
that reality as we know and inhabit it is institutional and therefore 
"man-made" and the desire (which contradicts the insight) for a 
reality that has been made by nature. That desire is the content of 
"mere," a word that marks the passage (already negotiated) from 
an observation-that the distinction between the unproblemmatic 
and the policy-oriented case is conventional-to a judgment-that 
because it is conventional, it is unreal .... Both [Kennedy and 
Gordon] proceed, in an almost unintelligible sequence, from the 
insight that the received picture of things is not given but historically 
74. Id. at 658. 
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contingent to the conclusion that history should be repudiated in 
favor of a truth that transcends it. Kennedy's specific target, ... 
like Gordon's, ... is to "abolish ... hierarchies, to take control 
over the whole of our lives, and to shape them toward the satisfac-
tion of our real human needs. "75 
Both Kennedy and Gordon, Fish argues, improperly assume the 
existence of "real human needs" as the basis for criticism of exercises 
of power. This insistence is impermissible. There are no real human 
needs. There are only more or less politically successful claims to the 
existence of such: 
The key word in the last sentence-taken from Peter Gabel and Jay 
Feinman's essay Contract Law as Ide%gy,-is "real" .... The 
complaint is that a set of related and finally equivalent realities-
real truth, real values, real knowledge, real authority, real motives, 
real need, real merit, the real self-is in continual danger of being 
overwhelmed or obscured or usurped by artifacts (fictions, fabrica-
tions, constructions) that have been created (imposed, manufactured) 
by forces and agencies that are merely professional or merely 
institutional or merely conventional or merely rhetorical or merely 
historical; and the program is simply to sweep away these artifacts-
and with them professions, institutions, conventions, rhetorics and 
history-so that uncorrupted and incorruptible essences can once 
again be espied and embraced. 76 
According to Fish, any critical claim that a professional, empow-
ered group (such as lawyers, judges, doctors, or chairmen of English 
departments) has used that power in a way that frustrates something 
"real" (such as "real human needs") is confused, disingenous, 
incoherent, and, worst ~f all, right-wing. Any such criticism violates 
the fundamental commitment of subjective interpretivism: there are 
only interpretations of right, interpretations of needs, or interpreta-
tions of truth; there are no real rights, needs or truths against which 
these interpretations can be evaluated: 
What is surprising, . . . is to find this the declared program of 
intellectuals who think of themselves as being on the left, and who 
therefore begin their considerations with a strong sense of the 
constitutive power of history and convention, and this leads me to 
[this] declaration ... : at the moment that a left-wing intellectual 
turns anti-professional, he has become a right-wing intellectual in 
disguise. 77 
What left-wing critics ought to be doing, Fish informs us (and 
them), is not criticising law on the basis of our "real" human needs 
75. [d. at 659-60. 
76. [d. at 661. 
77. [d. 
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or "real" potential, but instead, simply presenting alternative "imag-
inings, rationalizings, justifications, etc." to those presently espoused 
by the dominant vision. Just as the judge can't claim "truth" when 
he asserts that a contract does or doesn't exist (but can only claim 
institutional power), similarly a critic can't assert truth when she 
asserts that a law is frustrating our real needs, or is hurting us more 
than helping us, or is or isn't morally repugnant. All the critic, like 
the judge, can assert is institutional power-she either has it or she 
doesn't. The critic's alternative imagining, then, also cannot be 
judged on the basis of whether its assumptions are true or false to 
our real nature, our real needs, or our real potential. It can only be 
judged on the basis of whether or not the criticism has proven 
successful-whether it has displaced the dominant vision and become 
dominant itself. Thus, Fish completes his critique of Kennedy: 
Kennedy is right to say that teachers who persuade students that 
"legal reasoning is distinct as a method . .. from ethical and 
political discourse in general" have persuaded them to something 
false; but that is not the same as saying that they teach nonsense; 
they teach a very interested sense and teach it as if there were no 
other. The way to counter this is to teach or urge some other 
interested sense, some other ethical or political vision, by means of 
alternative arguments which, if successful, will be the new content 
of legal reasoning. This is in fact what Kennedy is doing in his 
essay, but it isn't what he thinks he's doing-he thinks he's clearing 
away the "mystification" of mere argument and therefore replacing 
nonsense with sense; but he can only think that in relation to a 
sense that is compelling apart from argument, a sense informed not 
by policy, but by something more real; and once he begins to think 
that way he has already bought into the ahistorical vision of his 
opponents, a vision in which essential truths are always in danger 
of being obscured by the special ... pleading of partisan interest. 78 
My sense (although perhaps not shared by either Gordon or 
Kennedy) is that Fish has exposed neither "closet right wingism" 
(Marx, for example, clearly believed there were such things as "real" 
human needs) nor confused, self-contradictory left intellectuals, but 
rather left-wing imperativism. What Fish objects to in Kennedy and 
Gordon is not a function of the latters' hidden right wing politics, 
but the profound difference, often masked by the ground they share, 
between Fish's subjective interpretivism and the imperativism of 
Gordon and Kennedy. For Gordon and Kennedy, whatever their 
other sins, have never committed the sin of self-contradiction that 
Fish thinks he has uncovered. Neither Gordon nor Kennedy have 
ever espoused the subjectivist thesis. Both thinkers, like Fish, are 
committed to the proposition that law is an act of power-that 
78. [d. at 659. 
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adjudication is political. But their reasons for thinking this differ 
from Fish's, and as a result of the difference, they are simply not 
bound to the view of the nature of criticism with which Fish wishes 
to saddle them. For Fish, adjudication is political because it is 
interpretive and all interpretation-including all critical acts such as 
legal criticism as well as literary criticism-is political. There are no 
more "real" human needs than there are real legal constructs (such 
as contracts, or rights, or duties). There are only interpretations of 
needs. For Kennedy and Gordon (as for the legal realists before 
them), adjudication is imperative because it is backed by force, not 
because it is interpretive. That adjudication is imperative, then, does 
not, for Kennedy and Gordon, imply the non-existence of a reality 
on which criticism of such imperatives can be built. From the 
imperativist perspective, the non-existence of "real" legal categories 
that preexist adjudication is a function of the power of judges to 
create those categories. The non-existence of real legal knowledge 
does not entail the non-existence of "real" anything else, such as 
human needs. Kennedy and Gordon may be right or wrong to insist 
on the existence of real human needs (or in their claims regarding 
what those needs are). But their claim that they exist does not ensnare 
them in contradiction, or in "right-wing" intellectual thinking. 
In fact, Fish's charge is peculiarly inappropriate, for it is his own 
view, not the view he attacks, that mutes radical criticism of law. 
For Fish, just as law is contingent on the political, historical will 
that creates it, value as well, whether derived from needs or rights, 
is contingent on the political will that creates it. We cannot criticize 
our political acts on the basis of their tendency to promote or 
frustrate real human needs or create real value: there are no real 
human needs just as there is no objective value. There are only 
claims to the existence of real human needs which mayor may not 
prove politically successful. The claim that a particular law frustrates 
our real needs has no more truth value than the claim that there 
exists a set of voidable contracts, tainted by objectively discoverable 
standards of unconscionability. Since value can only be whatever the 
historically powerful have succeeded in claiming it to be (just as 
contracts are whatever the courts enforce), and since criticism of law 
can only proceed by reference to value, we can only criticize law for 
its failure to comply with the standards generated by the powerful. 
We can ground our criticisms in our alternative "imagining," but we 
cannot ground that imagining in a vision of our real needs, or nature, 
or potential. Such a vision is nonsense-we have none. All we 
"really" have are varying degrees of power. 
Thus, subjective interpretivism is at one and the same time 
profoundly radical and profoundly conservative. As a mechanism for 
uncovering the political basis of legal ideology, it is radical: it goes 
to the root. The root of law is indeed power, and that insight is 
essential for any radical criticism of law. It shares this radicalism 
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with imperativism, and it is this feature, I believe, that makes 
sUbjectivism attractive to critical theorists such as Kennedy and 
Gordon. But subjective interpretivism, unlike imperativism, is also 
committed to a conservative vision of the potential of criticism. 
We cannot criticize the world given us by the powers that be on 
the basis of what ought to be-for there is no realm of the "ought" 
that is not itself an aspect of that which is. Criticism is interpretive, 
and interpretations must be based on texts. Texts are things that 
people-and more particularly, empowered people, such as people 
in professions-create. Criticism, then, can only be based upon 
interpretations of the positive values created by that branch of the 
community which has at some time made itself heard. We can use 
those positive values to criticize political acts that diverge from 
them. But we cannot criticize the values themselves on the basis of 
human needs drawn from extra-professional (or extra-political or 
ahistorical) sources. To do so is to commit the logical error of 
, , anti -professionalism. " 
B. Pro-Professionalism 
Fish insists that his attack on anti-professionalism-the mis-
guided tendency to criticize the dominant values of a profession 
(or a society) by reference to real human needs, real human 
potential, or a real human nature-is dictated by necessity: he is 
only describing what must be. We cannot coherently attack profes-
sionalism itself, or institutionalism itself, or power itself, because 
professionalism, institutionalism, and contingent power are all there 
is: they give us the values with which we criticize the part, and 
there are no independent values to which we can tum to criticize 
the whole. There is no real need to meet, or true potential to 
frustrate. There are, at best, alternative "imaginings. "79 
Yet, if deconstruction has taught us anything useful at all, it 
has taught us to be suspicious of precisely these sorts of claims of 
necessity. Fish is, after all, engaged in an interpretive act: he is 
interpreting the nature as well as the content of our social life. All 
of Fish's interpretations rest on his rock-bottom conviction that 
there is no ahistoric, non-contingent, "natural" realm, beyond (or 
beneath) history, against which history and the products of history 
(such as judicial decisions) can be judged. From this it follows that 
there are no natural needs, identities, pleasures, pains, "poten-
tials," or values. But surely this dreary view is not the only possible 
"interpretation" one can give of our experience of social life. 
Here's another: we have real needs that mayor may not be met 
79. [d. at 673-75. 
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by the historical, contingently chosen values of the e~powered. To 
name a few, we need love, food, shelter, meaningful work, nurtur-
ance, healing, play, and community. We have a natural need for 
and attraction to life itself. We have a natural self inside our three 
piece suits: it is the self who finds the suit stifling. We have a real 
potential for growth, creativity, work, community and meaning in 
our lives, and that potential may well be frustrated by our current 
social institutions. We judge those institutions, and we should judge 
those institutions including the professions and professionalism 
itself, by reference to how well they meet our very real human 
needs, whether they foster or stunt our very real potential, and 
whether they encourage or stifle our very real and natural longing 
for community. We criticize our "professionalism" by reference to 
the natural needs, feelings, and sensitivities of our non-contingent, 
ahistorical, non-institutional and thoroughly non-professional sel-
ves. If our social history, our professional selves-in short, the 
society we have created through our contingent choices-frustrates 
our natural needs we have good reason to change course. If 
professionalism stifles our natural and naturally social human life 
rather than encourages it to flourish then we have reason to 
question professionalism. Professionalism, or the institutional his-
tory of the empowered, is not, as Fish insists, all there is. It is not 
the only source of value. 
Why does Fish go to such lengths to deny the natural self? 
More importantly, why do so many? Why is this dreary interpre-
tation-that we "are," essentially, not what we eat, or what we 
love, or what we read, or what we dream, but what we profess in 
our public, professional lives-such a popular modem interpreta-
tion of life? Why has it captured the attention and the imagination 
of so many "left" critical scholars? The reason Fish is attracted to 
this vision is not hard to discern. Underscoring all of Fish's 
interrelated claims-that we have no "real" human nature; that 
our lives are exhaustively political; that we have no "real needs" 
or "real" potential against which to judge the acts or decisions of 
the powerful, but only conflicting "imaginings" which from time 
to time, and for various strategic reasons, assert that we do; that 
as a result of all of this, criticism, like law, is a series of commands 
with no "real" referent; that criticism, like law, can only be judged 
successful or unsuccessful, not warranted or unwarranted-is an 
unabashed celebration of power, in its institutional and professional 
manifestations. All there is, Fish argues again and again, is insti-
tutional, professional, and historical power, and therefore the only 
critical values there "are" are those generated by institutions and 
professions. But Fish reassures us, this turns out to be not cause 
for alarm, but cause for content. Power-and its historical mani-
festation in professional organizations, hierarchies, law and else-
where-is generally benign. Power doesn't crush, Fish reassures us, 
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power facilitates. Power enables. Power is energy itself. Power is 
the life-force. 8o 
Thus, Fish asserts a pro-professional faith which is at least as 
relentless as the anti-professionalism he is attacking. He defends 
the hierarchies in traditional English departments,81 is scornful of 
attacks on the professional roles of lawyers,82 and even comes to 
the defense of the gynecolical community of the late-nineteenth 
century.83 Power, Fish concludes, "not only constrains and ex-
80. [d. at 670. 
81. Fish states: 
[W]hen . . . [Fan to] . . . comes to descibe the hierarchical form of the 
profession, he can only view it as a grand deception practiced on ... 
victimized initiates: "The profession ... establishes a hierarchy and sets 
some individuals . . . at its summit together with the symbols associated 
with their names .... [T]hose new to the profession receive these symbols-
they are formed by them; they submit to their authority." What is missing 
here is any notice of the content of what Fanto calls "symbols," the 
research accomplishments, methodological techniques, powerful interpreta-
tions, pedagogical innovations, etc. that bring some men and women to the 
"summit" and from the basis of the authority that in Fanto's account is 
magically and arbitrarily conferred (seized rather than earned). He is so 
convinced beforehand that the deference accorded to institutional superiors 
is without foundation that he never bothers to catalogue the tasks, long-
standing puzZles, crucial problems, the negotiation and completion of which 
leads to professional recognition and promotion. To be sure, these tasks, 
problems and puzzles can be challenged as not worth doing, and there are 
some who "rise" independently of any such accomplishments; but, never-
theless, there is a great deal more to the acquiring of professional power 
than "the frequent celebration of the master in reviews" and other such 
gestures of servility that seem to make up Fanto's entire understandinding 
of the matter. 
[d. at 669. 
82. Fish states: 
[In the anti-professional's] ... view, it is not to much to say ... that in 
the act of becoming a professional one is in danger of losing his very 
humanity. This is the burden, for example, of a recent booklength complaint 
by a number of lawyers and law professors against the narrowing effects 
of their own education and professional experience . . .. [T]he authors 
produce a virtual compendium of anti-professionalist attitudes and argu-
ments. Professionalism is indicted as a threat to humartity and to values; 
the openness of disinterested inquiry is replaced by the unworthy goal of 
"master" or manipulation, and . . . the professional is himself mastered 
... by the constricted "roles and patterns" that are at once his weapons 
and his prison. The professional, in short, becomes his own victim as the 
cynicism he practices transforms him into its image, leaving him with the 
base motives of an empty and self-serving careerism. 
[d. at 647. 
83. Fish states: 
[A]nti-professionalism . .. [is] any attitude or argument that enforces a 
distinction between professional labors on the one hand and the identifi-
cation and promotion of what is true or valuable on the other . . . . It is 
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eludes, but enables, and . . . without some institutionally articulated 
spaces in which actions become possible and judgments become 
inevitable there would be nothing to do and no values to support. "84 
Thus underlying at least Fish's subjective interpretivism is an una-
bashed embrace of professional power. The contrast with Fiss is 
striking. Whereas Fiss solves the problem of power by constraining 
it with objectivity, Fish solves the problem of power by celebrating 
it. Fish sees interpretation, and therefore power, everywhere: he 
sees it not only in the courts (although of course he sees it there), 
but also in medical diagnoses, literary reviews, and in English 
departments. Of course interpretations of literature are acts of 
power, Fish explains, of course it is true that they are generated 
by as well as themselves determine careers, tenure decisions, ap-
pointments and diSmissals. But this is not cause for alarm; in fact, 
all is more or less as it should be. Power "enables." The politics 
in this spirit that Burton Bledstein ends his study of The Culture of 
Professionalism, calling his readers to an awareness of the "arrogance, 
shallowness, and potential abuses ... by venal individuals 'who justify their 
special treatment and betray society'S trust by invoking professional privi-
lege, confidence, and secrecy." In many of Bledstein's examples, this 
betrayal takes the form of allowing professional considerations to over-
whelm considerations of public and client welfare. Thus he cites late 
nineteenth-century "[g)ynecologists and psychiatrists" who" diagnose fe-
male hysteria as a pathological problem with a scientific etiology related to 
an individual's physical history rather than anger the public by suggesting 
it was a cultural problem related to dissatisfied females in the middle-class 
home." Underlying this criticism is something like the following scenario: 
faced with a situation in which they could choose from a number of 
explanations, these doctors chose that explanation which would strengthen 
their already entrenched interest by solidifying rather than alienating the 
support of middle-class America. It is a perfectly reasonable scenario, 
especially given the anti-professionaJist perspective, but it depends upon 
assumptions about the nature of the choice and the freedom of the choosing 
agents that I will later challenge . . . . [I)n this particular example the 
professional's betrayal of his clients is simultaneously a betrayal of the 
truth ... In the popular mind this particular form of professional abuse 
is typified by the behavior of lawyers who are entrusted with the determi-
nation and protection of truth, but who in practice deliberately obfuscate 
it by deploying procedural strategems that constitute the center of their 
craft and finally, of their commitment. In the process, or so the story goes, 
the very values for which the enterprise supposedly exists-justice and the 
promotion of the general welfare-are sacrificed to the special interests that 
the legal profession at once represents and embodies. 
[d. at 646. 
84. Although Fish would never put the point this way, what we mean by the 
claim that the departmental power wielded in English departments is generally 
benign, may simply be that English departments, even with their internal wars, 
further more than they frustrate our "real" human need for culture, diversity, 
language and intellectual and linguistic stimulation. 
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of interpretation is necessary. Far from being a necessary evil, it is 
an affirmative and necessary good. 
Noxious and even dangerous as I take the general view to be, 
there is nevertheless something refreshing about Fish's happy ac-
ceptance of the powers that be in English departments: many 
outsiders have begun to suspect that the critics of literary tradition-
alism have been protesting too much. Perhaps it is true that the 
institutional power wielded in English departments enables, or 
facilitates, more than it crushes, just as Fish suggests. It might be 
true that English departments, and the hierarchies that define them, 
promote discourse more than they silence it. They probably do 
encourage speech, over the long haul, more than they censure. 
Even the most sadistic, wrong-headed, ill-willed and ruthless de-
partmental chairperson-of which, I suspect, there are relatively. 
few-has limited reach. He or she can crush careers. But she 
cannot, and does not, fine, imprison, or execute. The exercise of 
power in English departments may well be generally benign. Al-
though Fish would never put the point this way, English depart-
ments, even with their internal wars, may further more than they 
frustrate our "real" human needs for culture, diversity, language, 
and intellectual and linguistic stimulation. 
It is a mistake though, and an unnecessary one, to view English 
departments and law courts as part of a seamless, interpretive web. 
Fish's optimism regarding the use of power in English departments 
is wildly out of place when applied to the power wielded by courts 
or legislatures. We can, perhaps, afford to be complacent about 
the power wielded by the departmental chair and the interpretive 
discourses that power facilitates. But we cannot afford to be 
complacent about. the power wielded by judges, lawyers, police, the 
wealthy, the dominant race, or the dominant gender. We cannot 
afford complacency about the extent of power held by legal profes-
sionals any more than we can afford the opposite tendency, evi-
denced by Fiss, to be blindly fearful of their power. Professionalism 
may facilitate, as Fish insists, but it also crushes. Power may 
sometimes enable, but it oftentimes destroys. We must recognize 
power when we see it, and we cannot afford to trivialize the 
discovery by insisting that we see it everywhere. We cannot afford 
to view the critic-whether literary or legal-as simply another 
center of power, professing simply another "imagining," which 
mayor may not prove successful. What the critic does-criticize 
the law-is profoundly different from what judges do, which is to 
command. They both use words and they both interpret the words 
of others. But we allow their shared tools to overshadow the 
difference between them at great risk. One speaks with the force 
of the state, and the other speaks, at best, with the force of reason. 
We should beware of the pro-professional's insistence that they are 
both cut from the same cloth. 
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V. SUBJECTIVISM, POLITICS AND NATURE: The Floating Opera 
John Barth's nihilistic novel The Floating Opera85 relates the 
story of a day in the life of a lawyer-protagonist named Todd 
Andrews on Maryland's Eastern Shore. On this day, Todd decides 
to commit suicide, then decides to commit mass murder, and finally 
decides not to do either. The burden of the novel is to explain 
these decisions. The novel is also a stinging indictment of "subjec-
tive interpretivism." For Todd Andrews, like Stanley Fish, is a 
"subjective interpretivist." Like Fish, Andrews embraces a subjec-
tive theory of interpretation, an imperative theory of law, a nihil-
istic theory of value, and an acquiescent, pro-professional attitude 
toward the powers that be and the values they have generated. The 
novel reveals Andrews' suicidal and murderous urges as attempts 
to come to grips with the logical derivatives of these premises. 
A. Todd Andrews as a Subjective Interpretivist 
Early in the novel, Andrews explains his subjective view of 
interpretation. Social life, Andrews claims, is a "floating opera." 
What we see as life, and what we see as "law," and what we see as 
"value," are all simply what we have happened to glimpse of the 
opera from our historical, contingent, and pathetically accidental spot 
along the shore. What we claim to "know" is entirely derived from 
the constructs given us by the creator of the opera, and the creator 
of the opera is us. We cannot know anything other than the floating 
opera. As a consequence, the interpretations we place upon the parts 
of the opera we happen to see are subjective: they depend upon our 
place on the shore-our perspective upon what we have made: 
Ah, me. Everything, I'm afraid, is significant, and nothing is finally 
important .... 
Why The Floating Opera? ... That's part of the name of a 
showboat that used to travel around Virginia and Maryland tide-
water areas . . . It always seemed a fine idea to me to build a 
showboat with just one big flat open deck on it, and to keep a play 
going continuously. The boat wouldn't be moored, but would drift 
up and down the river on the tide, and the audience would sit along 
both banks. They could catch whatever part of the plot happened 
to unfold as the boat floated past, and then they'd have to wait 
until the tide ran back again to catch another snatch of it, if they 
still happened to be sitting there .... I needn't explain that that's 
how much of life works; our friends float past; we become involved 
with them; they float on, and we must rely on hearsay or lose track 
of them completely; they float back again, and we either renew our 
85. J. BARTII, THE FLOATING OPERA (Doubleday & Company ed. 1967). 
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friendship-catch up to date-or find that they and we don't 
comprehend each other any more. And that's how this book will 
work, I'm sure. It's a floating opera, friend, fraught with curiosities, 
melodrama, spectacle, instruction, and entertainment, but it floats 
willy-nilly on the tide of my vagrant prose .... 86 
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For Andrews as for Fish, this subjective theory of interpretation 
entails an imperative theory of law: 
That will-o'-the-wisp, the law: where shall I begin to speak of it? 
Is the law the legal rules, or their interpretations by judges, or by 
juries? Is it the precedent or the present fact? The norm or the 
practice? I think I'm not interested in what the law is. 
Surely, though, I am curious about things that the law can be 
made to do, but this disinterestedly, without involvement. A child 
encounters a toy tractor, winds it up, and sets it climbing over a 
book. The tractor climbs well. The child puts another book here, 
so, and angles the first. The tractor surmounts them, with difficulty. 
The child opens the pages of the first book, leans the second 
obliquely against it, and places his shoe behind the two. The tractor 
tries, strains, spins, whirrs, and falls like a turtle on its back, treads 
racing uselessly. The child moves on to his crayons and picture 
puzzles, no expression on his face. I don't know what you mean, 
sir, when you speak of justice. 
All right. I have no general opinions about the law, or about 
justice, and if I sometimes set little obstacles, books and slants, in 
the path of the courts, it is because I'm curious, merely, to see 
what will happen. On those occasions when the engine of the law 
falls impotently sprawling, I make a mental note of it, and without 
a change of expression, go on to my boat or my Inquiry.87 
Furthermore, adjudication is imperative, Andrews shows, not by 
virtue of the judge's institutional power (as imperativists would have 
it)-it is not that adjudicative judgments are backed by force-but 
because judges use words. Words, through their multiple meanings, 
give their users, including judges, interpretive power. A court's 
interpretation of a will, for example, is "subjective" (and therefore 
chosen, not mandated) because it must be: there is no "objective 
meaning" of the will's provision to be discovered, whether or not 
the court makes a pretense of looking for one. Andrews demonstrates 
the point with a case. The issue in the case was whether Andrews' 
client, Harrison Mack, had breached a will condition that Harrison 
not engage in activities that show "sympathy" for communist causes. 
The lawyers' conflicting interpretations of the relevant social facts 
underscored the SUbjectivity of legal interpretation: 
86. Id. at 6-7. 
87. Id. at 84-85. 
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Froebel ... announced that he had such evidence [of communist 
sympathies] ... enough to warrant the reversal of bequests provided 
for by our will . . . . 
"For Heaven's sake!" Harrison whispered. "You don't think 
he means my Spanish donations!" 
"If you were silly enough to make any, then I daresay he does," 
I replied, appalled anew at Harrison's innocence. 
And indeed, the "Spanish donations" were precisely what Froe-
bel had in mind . . . . 
"May I point out," Froebel continued blandly, "that not only 
is a gift to the Loyalists in essence a gift to Moscow, but this 
particular subscription agency is a Party organization under FBI 
surveillance. A man . . . doesn't send checks to this subscription 
outfit unless one is sympathetic with the Comintem. Young Mr. 
Mack, like too many of our idle aristocrats is, I fear, a blue blood 
with a Red heart." 
I believe it was this final metaphor that won Froebel the 
judgment. . . . Men, I think, are ever attracted to the bon mot 
rather than the mot juste, and judges, no less than other men, are 
often moved by considerations more aesthetic than judicial. Even I 
was not a little impressed, and regretted only that we had no jury 
to be overwhelmed by such a purple plum from the groves of 
advocacy. A blue blood with a red heart! How brandish reason-
ableness against music? Should I hope to tip the scales with puny 
logic, when Froebel had Parnassus in his pan? 
"My client, a lover of freedom, and human dignity," I declared, 
"made his contributions to the oppressed Loyalists as a moral 
obligation, proper to every good american .... " 
And on I went for some minutes, trying to make capital out of 
the Spanish confusion, wherein the radicals were the status quo and 
the reactionaries the rebels. It was an admirable bit of casuistry, 
but I knew my cause was lost .... [T]he room was filled with [the 
sound of] blue bloods with Red hearts. 
And Judge Lasker, as I think I mentioned, was famously 
conservative. Though by no means a fascist himself . . . he epito-
mized the unthinking antagonism of his class toward anything pinker 
than the blue end of the spectrum: a familiar antagonism that used 
to infuriate me when . . . I was interested in such things as social 
justice.ss 
The judge, of course, must render an opinion consistent with 
law, not with poetry. The issue for the judge was whether or not 
Harrison's checks to the subscription agency representing the Spanish 
Loyalist government constituted, within the meaning of the phrase in 
the will, an act manifesting communist sympathies, thus precluding 
Mack's inheritance under the will. The Judge reasoned that it did: 
It does not matter whether there is a difference between the Moscow 
and Madrid varieties of communism, ... or whether the Court or 
88. [d. at 93-95 (emphasis original). 
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anyone else approves or disapproves of the defendant's gifts or the 
cause for which they were intended. The fact is that the subscription 
agency involved is a communist organization under government 
surveillance, and a gift to that agency is a gift to communism. There 
can be no question of the donor's sympathy with what the agency 
represented, and what it represented was communism. The will 
before me provides that should such sympathy be demonstrated, 
... the terms of the document are to be reversed. The Court here 
orders such a reversal. Well, we were poor again. Harrison went 
weak, and when I offered him a cigar he came near to vomiting.89 
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Andrews, of course, like Fish, sees a multiplicity of meaning in 
the will's phrase. Andrews is as good as Fish at spotting linguistic 
and behavioral ambiguities. The ambiguity Andrews spots in the 
judge's reasoning turns on the meaning of "sympathy." The judge 
had given "sympathy" a non-intentional meaning. Andrews points 
out, correctly, that such a meaning is by no means mandated by the 
will's language. Just as plausibly, the will could be read as requiring 
an intent to foster communism, which in this case, given Andrews' 
interpretation of Harrison's behavior, was absent: 
"Do you give up?" I asked him. "Or shall I appeal?" 
.... He clutched at the hope. "Can we appeal?" 
"Sure," I said. "Don't you see how unlogical Lasker's reason-
ing is? . . . He said the subscription agency was sympathetic to 
communism. You give money to the agency; therefore you're sym-
pathetic to communism. It's like saying that if you give money to 
a Salvation Army girl who happens to be a vegetarian you're 
sympathetic to vegetarians. The communists support the Loyalists; 
you support the Loyalists; therefore you're a communist." 
Harrison was tremendously relieved, but so weak he could 
scarcely stand .... "Well! That puts us back in the race, doesn't 
it? ... Damned judge! We've got it now, boy!"90 
The answer to Mack's question, of course, is "not necessarily." 
Andrews, like Fish, knows that judges decide cases by any number 
of factors, and that the "disciplining rule" that is deductive logic is 
not one of them. Unlike Fish, however, Andrews has the unpleasant 
task of explaining this to his client: 
"I'll appeal," I said, "but we'll lose again, I guess." 
"How's that? Lose again!" He laughed, and sucked in his 
breath. 
"Forget about the logic," I said. "Nobody really cares about 
the logic. They make up their minds by their prejudices about Spain. 
I think you'd have lost here even without Froebel's metaphor. I'd 
have to talk Lasker into liberalism to win the case." 
89. [d. at 95-96. 
90. [d. at 96. 
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I went on to explain that of the seven judges on the Court of 
Appeals . . . three were Republicans with a pronounced antiliberal 
bias, two were fairly liberal Democrats, one was a reactionary 
"Southern Democrat," ... and the seventh, an unenthusiastic 
Democrat, was relatively unbiased. 
"I know them all," I said. "Abrams, Moore, and Stevens, the 
Republicans, will vote against you. Forrester, the Southern Demo-
crat, would vote for you if it were a party issue, but it's not; he'll 
go along with the Republicans. Stedman and Barnes, the liberals, 
will go along with you, and I think Haddaway will too, because he 
likes me and because he dislikes Lasker's bad logic. 
"But hell, that's four to three!" Harrison cried. "That means 
I lose!" 
"As I said." .... Harrison was crushed. "It's unjust!"91 
Finally, like Fish, Andrews subscribes to the distinguishing com-
mitment of subjectivism: the denial of the existence of "objective" 
values. Like Fish, Andrews derives from his imperative vision of law 
and his subjective theory of meaning the nonexistence of such things 
as justice or fairness. This too must be explained to the client. Just 
as there are no "real" needs, or truths, or rights, or "testator's 
intents," Mack is going to have to come to grips with the fact that 
there is no real justice either: 
I smiled. "You know how these things are." "Aw, but what the 
hell!" He shook his head, tapped his feet impatiently, pursed his 
lips, sighed in spasms. I expected him to faint, but he held on 
tightly, though he could scarcely talk. The truth was, of course, 
that it is one thing-an easy thing-to give what Cardinal Newman 
calls "notional" assent to a proposition such as "There is no 
justice"; quite another and more difficult matter to give it "real" 
assent, to learn it stingingly, to the heart, through involvement. I 
remember hoping that Harrison was strong enough at least to be 
educated by his expensive loss. 
I appealed the judgment of the Court. 
"Just to leave the door open," I explained. "I might think of 
something.' '92 
Thus, for Andrews as for Fish, there are no more "objective 
values" than there are "objective laws." All values are socially 
constructed, or "subjective": 
What was on my mind, as I walked, was the grand proposition 
that had occurred to me while I was licking my cigar: that absolutely 
nothing has intrinsic value. Now that the idea was articulated in my 
head, it seemed to me ridiculous that I hadn't seen it years ago. All 
my life I'd been deciding that specific things had no intrinsic value-
91. [d. at 96-97. 
92. [d. at 97-98. 
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that things like money, honesty, strength, love, information, wis-
dom, even life, are not valuable in themselves, but only with 
reference to certain ends-and yet I'd never considered generalizing 
from those specific instances. But one instance was added to an-
other, and another to that, and suddenly the total realization was 
effected-nothing is intrinsically valuable; the value of everything is 
attributed to it, assigned to it, from outside, by people. 
I must confess to feeling in my tranquil way some real excite-
ment at the idea . . . . Doubtless (as I later learned) this idea was 
not original with me, but it was completely new to me, and I 
delighted in it like a child turned loose in the endless out-of-doors, 
full of scornful pity for those inside. Nothing is valuable in itself. 
Not even truth; not even this truth. I am not a philosopher, except 
after the fact; but I am a mean rationalizer, and once the world 
has forced me into a new position, I can philosophize (or rationalize) 
like two Kants, like seven Philadelphia lawyers. Beginning with my 
new conclusions, I can work out first-rate premises. 
On this morning, for example, I had opened my eyes with the 
knowledge that I would this day destroy myself ... ; here the day 
was but half spent, and already premises were springing to my 
mind, to justify on philosophical grounds what had been a purely 
personal decision. The argument was staggering. Enough now to 
establish this first premise: nothing is intrinsically valuable.93 
263 
The consequences of Andrews' moral nihilism, however, are far 
more devastating for Andrews than for his client. Andrews' adamant 
denial of the existence of objective value leads him to contemplate 
suicide: 
On this particular evening, to be sure, their progress would cease, 
for the notes I took then I intended to be my last. 
I. Nothing has intrinsic value. 
II. The reasons for which people attribute value to things are 
always ultimately irrational. 
III. There is, therefore, no ultimate "reason" for valuing anything. 
IV. Living is action. There's no final reason for action. 
V. There's no final reason for living. 9. 
Andrews' argument against objective value tracks Fish's. The 
"source" of value, Andrews argues, is social history-the floating 
opera. Our social history is the "floating opera," and the floating 
opera is all there is. All we "know" about life is the sum total of 
our interpretations of the opera. The floating opera is the sole text 
93. Id. at 170-71. 
94. Id. at 222-28. 
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from which subtexts are generated, so any values we adopt or employ 
are but interpretations of some subscript from the text of the floating 
opera. We can indeed criticize parts of the opera, but we can only 
criticize parts of the opera by reference to parts of the script we have 
heard or witnessed elsewhere. To translate from the metaphor: there 
are no objective interpretations of "values" by which we can criticize 
law (or politics, or "professionalism," or the values of the dominant) 
just as there are no objective "laws" by which we adjudicate cases. 
We cannot evaluate "institutionalism" or "professionalism" objec-
tively for the same reason that we cannot interpret law objectively: we 
are institutional and professional creatures, our values are institu-. 
tional and professional values, and the criticisms we make will reflect 
our institutional and professional situation; indeed they will be de-
pendent upon it. Value, like law, is a product of history: it is all a 
part of the opera. Our critical inclinations, like all our interpretive 
choices, are functions of our historical contingency. Values, far from 
being the bases for criticism of the powerful acts of others, are 
themselves nothing but disguised or not so disguised grabs at power 
and influence. 
B. Todd Andrews as a Pro-Professional 
Like Fish, Andrews emerges from his subjectivism as a card-
carrying "pro-professional." Andrews also harbors an acquiescent 
and even celebratory attitude toward the professions that generate 
dominant values. Like Fish, Andrews has moved beyond critique 
(and like Fish, he repeatedly reminds the reader of that fact). Andrews 
has seen the subjectivist's light. Life is the floating opera, and life is 
only the floating opera. Thoughts, perceptions and most importantly 
critical values are all dependent upon communicative texts generated 
by whatever snippets the opera provides the audience on the shore. 
The values that emerge from the opera exhaust the evaluative options 
open to us, and the values that emerge are, unsurprisingly, those of 
professions. Thus, Andrews explains his attitude toward his law 
practice: 
Winning or losing litigations is of no concern to me, and I think 
I've never made a secret of that fact to my clients. They come to 
me, as they come before the law, because they think they have a 
case. The law and I are uncommitted. 
One more thing, ... if you have followed this chapter so far, 
you might sensibly ask, "Doesn't your attitude-which is, after all, 
irresponsible-allow for the defeat, even the punishment, of the 
innocent, and at times the victory of the guilty? And does this not 
concern you?" It does indeed allow for the persecution of inno-
cence-though perhaps not so frequently as you might imagine. 
And this persecution concerns me, in the sense that it holds my 
attention, but not especially in the sense that it bothers me. Under 
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certain circumstances, to be explained later, I am not averse to 
pillorying the innocent, to throwing my stone, with the crowd, at 
some poor martyr. Irresponsibility, yes: I affirm, I insist upon my 
basic and ultimate irresponsibility. Yes indeed. 
It did not deeply concern me, as I said before, whether Harrison 
received his inheritance or not, though I stood' to profit by some 
fifty thousand dollars or more if he did. 95 
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And also like Fish, Andrews is utterly scornful of critical claims 
that lawyerly professionalism can sometimes frustrate real justice, 
real needs, or real individuals.96 In the Mack will case, the testator's 
95. [d. at 85. 
96. Andrews' pro-professionalism extends to the use of power facilitated by 
all political and hierarchical institutions, not just the legal profession. Thus, for 
example, the testator in the Mack case, like Andrews himself, harbors a pro-
professional attitude toward the power which testamentary capacity and wealth 
bestows. Andrews thoroughly approves: 
Old man Mack, ... died in 1935, after years of declining physical and 
mental health. He left a large estate . . . . It was, undeniably, an estate 
that many people would consider worth going to court about. 
Now of the several characteristics of Harrison pere, three were impor-
tant to the case: he was in the habit of using his wealth as a club to keep 
his kin in line; he was, apparently, addicted to the drawing up of wills; 
and, especially in his last years, he was obsessively jealous of the products 
of his mind and body, and permitted none to be destroyed .... 
It seems that disinheritance, or the threat of it, was the old man's 
favorite disciplinary measure, not only for his son, but also for his wife. 
When young Harrison [Andrews' eventual client] attended Dartmouth rather 
than 10hns Hopkins; when he studied journalism rather than business; 
when he became a communist rather than a Republican; he was disinherited 
until such time as he mended his ways. When Mother Mack went to Europe 
rather than to West Palm Beach; when she chose sparkling Burgundy over 
highballs, Dulaney Valley over Ruxton, Roosevelt and Gamer over Hoover 
and Curtis; she was disinherited until such time as she recanted her heresies. 
All these falls from the reinstatements to grace, of course, required 
emanations of Father Mack's will .... After the old man's death, when 
his safe was opened, a total of seventeen complete and distinct testamentary 
instruments was found, chronologically arranged, each beginning with a 
revocation of the preceding one . . . . 
Now this situation, though certainly unusual, would in itself have 
presented no particular problem . . . because the law provides that where 
there are several wills, the last shall be considered representative of the 
testator's real intentions, other things being equal .... But alas, with Mr. 
Mack all other things weren't equal. Not only did his physical well-being 
deteriorate in his last years, ... his sanity deteriorated also .... In the 
first stages he merely inherited and disinherited his relatives and his society; 
in the second he no longer went to work, ... and he allowed nothing of 
his creation-including hair and nail clippings, urine, feces, and wills-to 
be thrown away; in the last stages he could scarcely move or talk .... To 
be sure, the stages were not dramatically marked, but blended into one 
another imperceptibly. 
[d. at 85-87. 
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own mercurial and imperative attitude toward will-making had re-
sulted in a multiplicity of wills, and it had remained to his legatees 
and their lawyers (including Harrison and Andrews) to fight over 
which was binding. This prompted a thoroughly professional lawyer's 
brawl. Andrews thoroughly approved: 
Of the seventeen wills . . . only the first two were composed during 
the time when the old man's sanity was pretty much indisputable; 
that is, prior to 1933. The first left about half the estate to Harrison 
Jr. and the other half to Mother Mack, provided it could not be 
demonstrated to the court that she had drunk any sparkling bur-
gundy since 1920 .... The other ... left about half the estate to 
Mrs. Mack unconditionally and the rest to Harrison, provided it 
could not be demonstrated to the court that during a five year 
probationary period, 1932-37, Harrison had done, written, or said 
anything that could reasonably be construed as evidence of com-
munist sympathies . . . . 
Of the other fifteen documents, ten were composed in 1933 and 
1934, years when the testator's sanity was open to debate. The last 
five . . . could be established without much difficulty . . . as being 
the whims of a lunatic: one left everything to Johns Hopkins 
University on condition that the University's name be changed to 
Hoover College (the University politely declined) .... 
Luckily for the majesty of Maryland's law, there were only two 
primary and four secondary contestants for the estate .... [T]he 
testator's widow was interested in having Will #6 ... adjudged the 
last testament: it bequeathed her virtually the entire estate, on the 
sparkling-burgundy condition described above. Harrison Jr., pre-
ferred #8, ... it bequeathed him virtually the whole works, on the 
clean skirts condition also described above. [Three] ... registered 
nurses ... liked Wills #3, 9, and 12, ... therein, ... their late 
employer provided them remuneration for services beyond the line 
of <iuty. The final contestant was the pastor of the Macks' neigh-
borhood church; in Will #13 the bulk of the estate was to pass to 
that church, with the express hope that the richer and more influ-
ential organized religion became, the sooner it would be cast off by 
the people. 97 
Andrews' argument is Fish's: the dependency of inheritance en-
titlements on the outcome of a lawsuit rather than the intent of the 
testators-and hence on the vagaries of professionalism rather than 
the disinterested application of objective norms-is entirely necessary, 
thus obviating the issue of whether it is justifiable. If the "text" that 
is the judicial system is the only text we have by which to determine 
inheritance entitlements, then obviously, an inheritance entitlement 
"means" the sum total of whatever courts might be persuaded to 
rule. The "anti-professional" complaint that the court's ruling might 
97. [d. at 87-89. 
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be "wrong" because the entitlement was "really" otherwise rests 
upon the false claim that there exists "ideal" legal entities that 
transcend the history and politics that is adjudication-such as "en-
titlements," or "intents" or "testamentary capacities." Thus the 
Mack case, Andrews explains, was ultimately decided not through 
the disciplined application of objective standards of testamentary 
capacity, but rather, through a "welter of legal nonsense, threats and 
counterthreats:' , 
Each of [the three contestants], ... must attempt to prove two 
things: that Father Mack was still legally sane when the will of their 
choice was written, and that by the time the subsequent wills were 
written, he no longer could comprehend what he was about. On 
this basis, Miss Kosko (the nurse) had the strongest case, since her 
will ... was the earliest of the three. But love was her undoing: 
she retained as her attorney her boy friend, a lad fresh out of law 
school, none too bright. After our initial out-of-court sparring, I 
was fairly confident that he was no match for either Froebel or 
myself, and when, late in 1936, he refused on ethical grounds a 
really magnanimous bribe from Froebel, I was certain. 
And sure enough, when the first swords clashed in Baltimore 
Probate Court, ... Froebel was able, with little trouble, to insinuate 
that the young lawyer was an ass; that the nurse Miss Kosko was a 
hussy out to defraud poor widows of their honest legacies by 
seducing old men in their dotage; that Mrs. Mack ... had already 
offered the trollop a gratuity more munificent than she deserved 
. . . and that even to listen tolerantly to such ill-concealed avari-
ciousness was a tribute to the patience and indulgence of long-
suffering judges. In addition, Froebel must have offered some cogent 
arguments, for surrogate courts, even in Baltimore, are notoriously 
competent, and the judge ruled in his favor .... 98 
With the field narrowed, the case became a dispute between 
mother and son. That the lawsuit was hostage to the lawyers' 
overriding adversarial interest-whether for money or for the thrill 
of the game, was entirely appropriate. Andrews insists on the pro-
professional prerogative: 
There was not much difference between Mack's mental state in late 
1933 and his mental state in early 1934 .... I got the impression 
that the judge-a staid fellow-believed Mack had been insane from 
the beginning. The newspapers, too, expressed the opinion that there 
was no particular evidence on either side, and that, besides, it was 
a disgraceful thing for a mother and her son to squabble so selfishly. 
All the pressure was for out-of-court settlement on a fifty-fifty 
basis, but both Harrison and his mother-who had never especially 
liked each other-refused, on the advice of their attorneys. Froebel 
98. [d. at 89-90. 
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thought he could win, and wanted the money; I thought I could 
win, and wanted to see.99 
C. The Floating Opera and Pro-Professionalism 
Like Fish's, Andrews' pro-professional attitude proves hard to 
contain to the professions. Andrews acquieses not only in the profes-
sional mores of his own field, but in all dominant mores. If the legal 
text is "the only text there is" for testamentary entitlements, then 
there is no way to criticize the legal outcome as untrue to the "real" 
entitlement. In a perfectly parallel fashion, if the floating opera-
our social history-provides the only text of moral value, then there 
is no way to criticize the opera itself as untrue to the "real text" of 
value. We cannot evaluate the opera by reference to values derived 
from the opera's text. Our reaction to the floating opera can only be 
a reaction to the part of the opera we happen to see, and the part 
we happen to see is a function of our place on the shore. We can 
criticize parts of the opera on the basis of other parts of the opera, 
but we cannot criticize the opera itself. 
Andrews, however, carries this argument one step further than 
Fish, and that step is both logical and murderous. The lack of a 
"real" basis for criticism of the opera directly implies the lack of a 
"real" basis for its justification. The floating opera cannot provide 
a basis for justification of its own existence any more than it can 
provide a basis for critique. There is no ultimate "reason" why the 
floating opera should not destroyed. And if that's so, Andrews asks, 
why not blow it up? Andrews can see no reason to either blow it up 
or not blow it up. In a moment of mercurial and imperative pro-
professional whimsy, Andrews resolves to destroy the opera, with 
himself as a member of the audience: 
It was, of course, entirely dark outside except for the Opera's lights. 
I found myself, as I'd planned, on the outboard side of the theatre 
. . . . I walked swiftly down the starboard rail . . . and let myself 
into the dining room, under the stage . . . . I struck a match and 
lit three kerosene lanterns mounted along the dining-room walls, 
... Finally I entered the galley, a few feet away, put a match to 
one burner, and turned the others ... full on, unlighted. A strong 
odor of bottled illuminating gas filled the little room at once. 
. . . Then I slipped out as I'd entered and took my place again 
in the audience, now wonderfully agitated, . . . My heart, to be 
sure, pounded violently, but my mind was calm. Calmly I regarded 
my companion Captain Osborn . . . . Calmly I thought of Harrison 
and Jane: of perfect breasts and thighs scorched and charred; of 
certain soft, sun-smelling hair crisped to ash. Calmly too I heard 
99. Id. at 90-91. 
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somewhere the squeal of an overexcited child, I considered a 
small body, formed perhaps from my own and flawless Jane's, 
black, cracked, smoking. Col. Morton, Bill Butler, old Mr. and 
Mrs. Bishop-it made no difference, absolutelyYlO 
269 
For unexplained reasons, however, the boat does not explode. 
The opera does not burn. Andrews, true to form, doesn't particularly 
care. The unexpected turn of events does, though, prompt a new 
answer to his question "why not blow up the floating opera?" The 
answer: "Why bother?" 
I rather suspected that either some hidden source of ventilation . . . 
or wandering member of the crew had foiled my plan. Need I tell 
you that I felt no sense either of relief or disappointment? As when 
the engine of the law falls sprawling against my obstacles, I merely 
took note of the fact that despite my intentions six hundred ninety-
nine of my townspeople and myself were still alive. 
Why did I not, failing my initial attempt, simply step off the 
gangplank into the Choptank, where no fluke could spoil my plan? 
Because, I began to realize, a subtle corner had been turned. I asked 
myself, knowing there was no ultimate answer, "Why not step into 
the river?" as I had asked myself in the afternoon, "Why not blow 
up the Floating Opera?" But now, at once, a new voice replied 
casually, "On the other hand, why bother?" There was a corner 
for you! Negotiated unawares, ... this corner confronted me with 
a new and unsuspected prospect-at which, for the moment, I could 
only blink. 101 
There is a better answer to Andrews' question than "why bother." 
Of course it is true, as both Andrews and Fish correctly insist, that 
the answer to the question "why not blow up the floating opera," 
or "why preserve the floating opera," or "why not make the floating 
opera better," cannot be found in the floating opera itself; it is the 
floating opera whose value is in question, including any values the 
opera establishes. We cannot turn to the values generated by profes-
sionalism, or the legal system, or institutional histories, if we wish 
to determine the value of professionalism, the legal system, or 
institutionalism. If we look only to the opera, we will not find there 
values by which we can judge the opera. The values created by a 
profession cannot be used to judge the profession. The values created 
by the system of law cannot be used to judge it. The values held by 
a community cannot be the referent against which the community is 
judged. 
But that doesn't mean the question is unanswerable. If we want 
to judge the opera-if we want an answer to the question "why not 
blow up the floating opera" -we must look to a different text. 
100. [d. at 242-43. 
101. [d. at 246-47. 
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Andrews' question is only unanswerable if the floating opera is the 
only text there is. But it isn't. As Andrews reminds us at the 
beginning, the floating opera is social life, not life itself. It is a 
metaphor for our socially created, contingent, constructed history. If 
we want to judge the social life we have politically created, we must 
look not to our held social values (for those are part of our creation), 
but to the needs and values of the unconstructed, ahistorical animal 
self within. The natural self and its needs-for fulfillment, nurtur-
ance, intimacy, productivity, security, and variety-provide the stable 
text against which to judge the value of the floating social self we 
have created. 
D. The Animalistic Self and the Rejection of Nature 
Andrews, like Fish, rejects the natural self as a moral text for 
criticism of social life, but for entirely different reasons. Fish, as 
argued above, denies the existence of the natural, ahistorical self, 
and accordingly denies the reality of "natural human needs." An-
drews does not. In fact, Andrews insists upon the reality of a natural, 
ahistorical, non-contingent, animalistic self, complete with natural, 
ahistorical, non-contingent and "real" human needs, defined by 
nature instead of social history. Andrews does not deny the animal 
within (as does Fish); he suppresses the animal within. Andrews' pro-
professionalism is not an attitude masked as logical necessity. Rather, 
it is an openly acknowledged preference. Andrews simply prefers the 
floating opera to the stable, instinctual, universal, and natural expe-
riences of animalism. Andrews' suppression of his natural self and 
the values he might generate from it is based almost entirely upon 
his memory of a war experience. The war story is worth retelling-
for Andrews' interpretation of it, I will argue, is wrong, as is the 
anti-naturalism lesson he learned. 
The story, as Andrews relates it "appropros of nothing," is as 
follows. During World War II, in the middle of the Battle of the 
Argonne, in the middle of vast confusion and in the middle of the 
night, Andrews experienced for the first and only time in his life 
"real" fear. The fear was animalistic. It was not "socially con-
structed." It was not a part of the floating opera. It was not the 
product of professionalism, power, choice or social construct. The 
feeling originated in his natural, not his social, self: 
The next thing that happened ... happened in the dark. Suddenly 
it had been nighttime for a while. This time it was I who was in a 
hollow, on all fours in a shell hole half full of muddy water. I still 
had my rifle, but it was empty, and if I owned any more ammuni-
tion, I didn't remember how to put it in the rifle .... And now 
there came real fear, quickly but not suddenly, a purely physical 
sensation. It swept over me in shuddering waves from my thighs 
and buttocks to my shoulders and jaws and back again, one shock 
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after another, exactly as though rolls of flesh were undulating. 
There was no cowardice involved; in fact, my mind wasn't engaged 
at all- .... Cowardice involves choice, but fear is independent of 
choice. When the waves reached my hips and thighs I opened my 
sphincters; when they crossed my stomach and chest I retched and 
gasped; when they struck my face my jaw hung slack, my saliva 
ran, my eyes watered. Then back they'd go again, and then return. 
I've no way of knowing how long this lasted: perhaps only a minute. 
But it was the purest and strongest emotion I've ever experienced. 
I could ... regard myself objectively: a shocked, drooling animal 
in a mudhole. It is one thing to agree intellectually to the proposition 
that man is a species of animal; quite another to realize, thoroughly 
and for good, your personal animality, to the extent that you are 
actually never able to oppose the terms man and animal, even in 
casual speech ... ,,02 
271 
Next, Andrews continues, he experienced "real" loneliness-a "real 
need" for intimacy and companionship. Furthermore, when the 
feeling came upon him it was in sharp conflict with the demands of 
his professional role of soldier: 
The other part of the incident followed immediately. Both armies 
returned from wherever they'd been hiding, and I was aware for 
the first time that a battle was really in progress. A great deal of 
machine-gun fire rattled across the hollow from both sides; ... and 
there was much shooting, shouting, screaming and cursing ... . 
With a part of my mind I was perfectly willing to join in the 
fighting, though I was confused; if someone had shouted orders at 
me, I'm certain I'd have obeyed them. But I was left entirely alone, 
and alone my body couldn't move ....• 
Finally the artillery opened up again, apparently laying their 
fire exactly in the hollow, where the hand-to-hand fighting was in 
progress. Perhaps both sides had resolved to clean up that untidy 
squabble with high-explosive shells and begin again. Most of the 
explosions seemed to be within a few hundred feet of my hole, and 
the fear returned. There was no question in my mind but that I'd 
be killed; what I feared was the knowledge that my dying could 
very well be protracted and painful, and that it must be suffered 
alone. The only thing I was able to wish for was someone to keep 
me company while I went through it. 
Sentimental? It certainly is, and I've thought so ever since. But 
that's what the feeling was, and it was tremendously strong, and 
I'd not be honest if I didn't speak of it. 1m . 
His natural need for companionship, however, overcame his 
professional duty as soldier. Thus, when an enemy soldier jumped 
unexpectedly into Andrews' hole, instead of attacking him, Andrews 
attempted to embrace him: 
102. [d. at 62-63. 
103. [d. at 63-64. 
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It was such a strong feeling that when from nowhere a man jumped 
into the mudhole beside me, I fell on him instantly and embraced 
him as hard as I could. Very sensibly he assumed I was attacking 
him, and with some cry of alarm he wrenched away. I fell on him 
again, before he could raise his rifle, . . . I shouted in his ear that 
I didn't want to fight with him; that I loved him; and at the same 
time-since I was larger and apparently stronger than he-I got 
behind him and pinioned his arms and legs. He struggled for a long 
time, and in German, so that I knew him to be an enemy soldier. 
How could I make everything clear to him? ... [H]e would certainly 
think me either a coward or a lunatic, and kill me anyway. He had 
to understand everything at once. I04 
Andrews next wrestled with an internal as well as external struggle 
between need and power, loneliness and conquest, natural life and 
professional role: 
Of course, I could have killed him, and I'm sure he understood 
that fact; he was helpless. What I did, finally, was work my rifle 
over to me with one hand, after rolling my companion onto his 
stomach in the muddy water, and then put the point of my bayonet 
on the back of his neck, until it just barely broke the skin and drew 
a drop of blood. My friend went weak-collapsed in fact-and 
what he cried in German I took to be either a surrender, a plea for 
mercy, or both. Not wanting to leave any doubts about the matter, 
I held him there for several minutes more, ... until he broke down, 
lost control of all his bodily functions, as I had done earlier, and 
wept. He had, I believe, the same fear; certainly he was a shocked 
animal. 
Where was the rest of the U.S. Army? Reader, I've never 
learned where the armies spent their time in this battle! illS 
Finally, these two "shocked animals," shed of their professional 
roles, fulfilled what Fish denies exists: their natural, human needs. 
They acted on the basis of natural need, rather than on the basis of 
professional role. To judge the acts of two shocked animals by 
reference to the values derived from the contingencies of profession-
alism, history, and "power," Andrews insists, would simply be 
"stupid" : 
Now read this paragraph with an open mind; I can't warn you too 
often not to make the quickest, easiest judgments of me, if you're 
interested in being accurate. The thing I did was lay aside my rifle, 
bayonet and all, lie in the mud beside this animal whom I'd reduced 
to paralysis, and embrace him as fiercely as any man ever embraced 
his mistress. I covered his dirty stubbled face with kisses: his staring 
eyes, his shuddering neck. Incredibly, now that I look back on it, 
he responded in kind! The fear left him, as it had left me, and for 
104. [d. at 64. 
105. [d. at 64-65. 
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an hour, I'm sure, we clung to each other. 
If the notion of homosexuality enters your head, you're normal, 
I think. If you judge either the German sergeant or myself to have 
been homosexual, you're stupid. 106 
273 
As the professional power of the two men subsided, the fear 
diminished as well, and in its place arose feelings of pleasure and 
intimacy that accompany the satiation of need. Andrews' experience, 
I believe, stands as a sharp rebuke to Fish's claim that there are no 
natural needs, and that the satiation of those needs cannot constitute 
a natural text for the derivation of ethical values against which to 
judge our historical and professional exercises of power. For one 
night for these two soldiers, the battle had moved elsewhere, and the 
de-professionalized soldiers enjoyed animalistic pleasure of intimacy: 
After our embrace the trembling of both of us subsided, and we 
released each other. There was a complete and, to my knowledge, 
unique understanding between us .. . . A great many shells were 
whistling overhead, but none were bursting very near us, and the 
hand-to-hand fighting had apparently moved elsewhere. 
The German and I sat on opposite sides of the shell hole, 
perhaps five feet apart, smiling at each other in complete under-
standing. Occasionally we attempted to communicate by gestures, 
but for the most part communication was unnecessary. I had dry 
cigarettes; he had none. He had rations; I had none. Neither had 
ammunition. Both had bandages and iodine. Both had bayonets. 
We shared the cigarettes and rations; I bandaged the wound in his 
neck, and he the wound in my leg. He indicated the seat of his 
trousers and held his nose. I indicated the seat of my trousers and 
did likewise. We both laughed until we cried, and fell into each 
other's arms again-though only for an instant this time: our fear 
had gone, and normal embarrassment had taken its place. We 
regarded each other warmly. Perhaps we slept. 
Never in my life had I enjoyed such intense intimacy, such clear 
communication with a fellow human being, male or female, as I 
enjoyed with that German sergeant . . . . While he slept I felt as 
jealous and protective-I think exactly as jealous and protective-
as a lion over her cub. If any American, even my father, had 
jumped into the shell hole at that moment, I'd have killed him 
unhesitatingly before he could kill my friend. What validity could 
the artifices of family and nation claim beside a bond like ours? I 
asked myself . . . . He and I had a private armistice ... For the 
space of some hours we had been one man, had understood each 
other beyond friendship, beyond love, as a wise man understands 
himself. 107 
106. [d. at 65. 
107. [d. at 65-66. 
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As light returned, however, Andrews' sense of professionalism 
returned, and with that sense came power, suspicion, role-morality, 
professional duty, and fear: 
Let me end my story , , , , [A]fter a while [there arose] a germ of 
a doubt in my mind, , , , How could I be certain that our incredible 
sympathy did not actually exist only in my imagination, and that 
he was not all the while smiling to himself, taking me for'a lunatic 
or a homosexual crank, biding his time , , , until he was good and 
ready to kill me? Only a hardened professional could sleep so 
soundly and contentedly in a mudhole during a battle, There was 
even a trace of a smile on his lips , , , , Was it not something of a 
sneer? 
I grew increasingly nervous, and peered out of my hole, Not a 
living soul was visible, though a number of bodies lay in various 
positions and degrees of completeness on the ground , , , , The air 
was full of smoke and dust and atmospheric haze, ' , , , I sat back 
in the hold and stared nervously at the German sergeant, waiting 
for some sign of his awakening, I even took up my rifle , .. just 
to be safe. I was getting jumpier all the time . . . . lOS 
Next ensued-again-the familiar struggle between natural need 
and professional power, between intimacy and fear, between mutual 
trust and destruction, and finally, between life and death. This time, 
professional suspicion overtook natural need. Andrews killed his 
friend and enemy: 
Finally I decided to sneak quietly out of the hole and make my way 
to the Americans, ... leaving the German asleep. A perfect solu-
tion! I rose to my feet, holding my rifle and not taking my eye 
from the German soldier's face. At once he opened his eyes, and 
although his head didn't move, a look of terrible alarm flashed 
across his face. In an instant I lunged at him and struck him in the 
chest with my bayonet. The blow stunned him, ... but the blade 
lodged in his breastbone and refused to enter. 
My God! I thought frantically. Can't I kill him? He grasped 
the muzzle of my rifle in both hands, trying to force it away from 
him, but I had better leverage .... We strained silently for a 
second. My eyes were on the bayonet; his, I fear, on my face. At 
last the point slipped up off the bone, from our combined strain-
ing-our last correspondence!-and with a tiny horrible puncturing 
sound, slid into and through his neck, and he began to die. I 
dropped the rifle . . . and fled, trembling, across the shattered 
hollow. By merest luck, the first soldiers I encountered were Amer-
ican, and the battle was over for me. 109 
108. Id. at 66-67. 
109. [d. at 67-68. 
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It is on the basis of this experience that Andrews decided to reject 
naturalism and limit his moral universe to the conventionalism that 
emerged from the floating opera: 
That's my war story .... [I]t cured me of several things .... I 
never expect very much from myself or my fellow animals. I almost 
never characterize people in a word or phrase, and rarely pass 
judgment on them at all. I no longer look for the esteem or 
approbation of my acquaintances .... To be sure, I don't call that 
one incident, traumatic as it proved to be, the single cause of all 
these alterations in me .... But when I think of the alterations, I 
immediately think of the incident (specifically, I confess, of that 
infinitesimal puncturing noise), and that fact seems significant to 
me, .... 110 
But Andrews has misinterpreted his own war story. It was not 
animalism, but professionalism, that prompted him to kill the Geman 
sergeant. The two "animals" in the hole in the battle of the Argonne 
met each others' needs-for sustenance, for intimacy, for compan-
ionship, for love, for "merging" (Barth's word), for union, for 
healing and for nurturance. When stripped of their professional 
identities and roles, these two animals fed each other, embraced each 
other, protected each other, healed each other, and loved each other. 
It was only as their culturally created, socially constructed, profes-
sionally defined "roles" returned, that the two men came, once 
again, to see themselves as in "opposition" to each other. As 
Andrews became more of a professional and less of an animal, he 
viewed his friend as less of a friend and more a professional sergeant, 
less a companion and more a German enemy, less a source of 
nurturance and more a threat. It was the re-awakened professional, 
not the animal, that killed the German soldier. It was Andrews' 
participation in the floating opera, not his participation in nature, 
that dictated his final act of power. It was professionalism, not 
animalism, that Andrews should have learned to mistrust. 
Furthermore, because Andrews has wrongly interpreted these acts, 
he has also wrongly judged them. If our evaluative and critical 
strategies are constrained by professional imperatives, then Andrews' 
act in the Argonne-his unnecessary killing of the German soldier-
surely cannot be criticized. If, as Fish would insist, the professional 
text Andrews was given-the professional duty to kill or capture 
enemy soldiers, and the enemy status of the German sergeant-was 
all that was critically available to him, then he could not help but 
employ those texts. He killed within a professional context that 
rendered that behavior both right and inevitable. "To kill" was the 
imperative of the professional context in which he found himself. If 
110. [d. at 68. 
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it is true that our professional context provides the only basis on 
which we can ground the "critical moment," then Andrews' action 
is beyond criticism: he literally had no choice. It was what the 
professionalism of his place and time demanded. . 
However, the professional text is not the only test, and it was 
not the only text available to Andrews. If, as opposed to Fish's view, 
the professional script that dictated Andrews' act was one of (at 
least) two possible scripts, one professional and the other natural, 
then Andrews' act was a choice, not an historical necessity, and 
should be judged as such. Andrews did have a choice: he chose to 
kill. He chose to act professionally when he could have acted natu-
rally. He chose to reject need, nature, life, and intimacy, and act 
instead with the full destructive power of the professional. He chose 
to oppose rather than embrace. He could have acted on the basis of 
natural need, and instead he acted on the basis of professional power. 
He could have fled, and instead he fought. The professional imper-
atives within which Andrews acted help the reader forgive the act. 
But professional imperatives do not, as Fish suggests, exhaust our 
critical capacities. 
We can indeed criticize our professional acts and professional 
roles from the point of view of our real human needs. The natural, 
intimate, needy, and animalistic self can criticize the contingent, 
historical, powerful and professional killer. The animalistic self along-
side the "professional" self generates value that transcends historical 
values, and a knowledge beyond and beneath that which history 
provides. The knowledge and value of the animalistic self provide 
what Fish insists does not exist: an ahistorical referent from which 
we can critique the product of history; an ahistoric point of view 
from which to critique the floating opera. The animalistic self is a 
way of being that is not contingent on the happenstance of history, 
and provides us a source of value that is tied to nature rather than 
culture. From the vantage of the natural self, we critique the floating 
opera, just as, from our position in the floating opera, we critique 
the animal within us. The relationship must be reciprocal: profes-
sionalism gives us a referent from which to critique our natural self 
and our natural setting, just as our natural self gives us a position 
from which to critique the products of history, culture and profes-
sionalism. From the natural text, we evaluate the communicative text. 
It is the natural self to which we must return, if we are to question 
the value of our professional roles. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I do not mean to insist by this critique that lawyers and legal 
scholars have nothing to learn from the many conflicting views on 
the nature of literary interpretation and criticism presently being 
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debated by hermeneutic thinkers. Law is surely like literature in some 
important ways, and legal criticism-whether done by judges as a 
part of the adjudicative enterprise, or by legal theorists as part of 
the critical enterprise-is surely like literary criticism in important 
ways. Literature and law, literary criticism and legal criticism, and 
literary interpretation and legal interpretation all deal in verbal texts. 
But insights drawn from literary theory can mislead as well as inform, 
if applied to law too unthinkingly. There are important differences 
between literature and law, between literary criticism and legal criti-
cism, and between literary interpretation and legal interpretation. The 
most important difference is the most obvious: law-including adju-
dicative law-is imperative and literature is expressive. People who 
create law use words to express commands backed by sanctions; 
novelists do not. The legal text is a command; the literary text is a 
work of art. This difference implies others. Legal criticism-criticism 
of law-is criticism of acts of power; literary criticism - criticism 
of literature-is the criticism of acts of expression. Legal interpreta-
tion is the attempt to ascertain the meaning behind a command; 
literary interpretation is the attempt to ascertain the meaning behind 
an artistic expression. Law is a product of power. Literature, when 
it is good, is not. Participants in the law as literature movement go 
to great lengths to deny these differences. For all interpretivists, 
power does not distinguish adjudication from other uses to which we 
put our language. 
The arguments of objectivists and subjectivists for the law-liter-
ature parallel, and the consequences they draw from that parallel, 
radically diverge, and it is to these internal divisions that the energies 
of subjectivists and objectivists have been devoted .. Objective inter-
pretivists insist that it follows from the interpretive core of adjudi-
cation that law is not an act of power, but is instead an act of 
cognition, while the subjective interpretivist insists that it follows 
from the interpretive core of adjudication that law is indeed an act 
of power, as are all interpretive acts. But both groups deny the 
central claim of imperativism: to wit, that adjudication, of all in-
terpretive acts, is distinctively an act of power-that adjudication, 
even though it is interpretive, has more in common with legislation 
than it has with either literary creativity or literary criticism. As a 
consequence of their shared ground, both views have stultifying 
consequences for the criticism of law. To the objective interpretivist, 
our basis for legal criticism is limited to standards of consistency, 
coherence, or, in Dworkin's telling phrase, "integrity" with the 
community's moral codes: we should ask for consistency with the 
community's positivistic morality, but we can't ask for much more. 
For the subjective interpretivist, legal criticism is even more con-
strained: like law itself, criticism is a product of power, and like law 
itself, there is no non-political realm against which its value or truth 
HeinOnline -- 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 278 1986-1987
278 TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 54 
can be measured. Legal criticism is limited to standards of consist-
ency, not with the community's moral code, but with the profession-
al's. 
By focusing on the distinctively imperative core of adjudication, 
instead of its interpretive gloss, we free up meaningful criticism of 
law. Adjudication, like all of law, is imperative-it is a part of 
politics. Politics, like all of history, is contingent-it is part of that 
which is-and interpretation of law is and should be grounded in 
this historical, contingent, and positive text. The criticism of law, by 
contrast, must be grounded in a different text. It cannot be grounded 
in yet another interpretation of that which is. It must rest on a claim 
regarding that which ought to be, not a claim regarding that which 
is, or how power has been used to date. It must be grounded in the 
text we didn't write-the text of our natural needs, our true potential, 
our utopian ideals. Criticism of law must be grounded in the natural 
and ideal text, not the contingent text, if it is to be truly critical. 
How do we, or should we, criticize an act of power? In public 
life, no less than in private life, I believe we should criticize acts of 
power not by reference to their rationality, or their coherency, or 
their "integrity," but by reference to their motivation and their 
effects. An act of power in public life as well as in private life that 
is praiseworthy is an act of power which, in short, is loving: it is the 
act that originates in the heart and is prompted by our sympathy for 
the needs of others, and empathy for their situation. I see no reason 
not to hold adjudicatory acts of power to this standard. Brown v. 
Board of Education, 111 for example, is a good opinion, because it is 
a sympathetic rather than cynical response to a cry of pain, not 
because it renders "consistent" conflicting strands of constitutional 
jurisprudence. Indeed, the strength of the opinion lies more in its 
willingness to ignore the community's texts rather than its willingness 
to read them: the opinion speaks to our real need for fraternity 
rather than our expressed xenophobia; and it taps our real potential 
for an enlarged community and an enlarged conception of self rather 
than our expressed fear of differences. The test of the morality of 
power in public life as in private life may be neither compliance with 
community mores, as objectivists insist, nor political success, as 
subjectivists claim, but love. Imperativism, distinctively, frees the 
critic for this possibility. 
111. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
